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INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of postwar Japan has surprised many
economists. In his analysis of this growth, Miyohei Shinohara
gives considerable attention to two factors: first, the
postwar recovery, and second, capital concentration and the
dual economy, in which modern and old-fashioned industries
co-exist. In addition, he examines the export growth
potential, the high savings ratio, the entrepreneurial
behavior and the industrious nature of the Japanese people
as subordinate causes of Japan's burgeoning economy. This
paper, however, is limited to an examination of the role
played by savings in the high rate of growth of postwar Japan.
The first chapter provides an analysis of the
relationship between economic growth and savings. Chapters
Two, Three, Four, and Five, are devoted, respectively, to
the four basic sectors of Japanese economy: the private
household, the corporation, the government, and foreign
trade. Personal saving includes mainly farmers' and urban
workers' households. The analysis of corporate saving
examines sources of corporate investment funds and the
pattern of corporation finance. Chapter Four is a discussion
of government saving and government finance. Chapter Five
is an examination of Japan's financial structure and its
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influence on savings. In addition, this chapter demonstrates
the strengths and weaknesses of indirect financing.
The Conclusion is in three parts. The first part
consists of the factors causing rapid growth. The second
part is a summary analysis of present status of Japanese




JAPAN'S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SAVINGS
Record of Economic Growth
One of the Important changes in economic thinking
as compared to the prewar period Is the growing conscious
ness of economic growth. Nowadays, almost every politician,
both in developed and developing countries, talks about
economic growth. In the developed countries, as the
cyclical fluctuations and accompanying unemployment which
were the major economic issues in prewar years have more
or less been overcome In recent years, people are more
concerned with the long-term aspects of growth. In the
developing countries, economic growth is taken as the vital
factor for the improvement of the living standard. In
Japan, as in other countries, economic growth Is a favorite
subject of discussion, not only among professional economists
but also among politicians and business people. In
particular, since the late Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda
made economic growth his political slogan by introducing
the Idea of an income doubling plan, economic growth and
its accompanying impact has been a very controversial issue
in both political and economic life in Japan.
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Postwar economic growth in Japan, when compared
with that of foreign countries or with her own prewar
performance, has indeed been remarkable. The average
annual rate for the period of 1955-65, measured in terms
of gross national product (GNP) in constant prices was
9.9 per cent. As is shown in Table (I-l) this figure
compares very favorably with that of other advanced
countries. It was more than double the prewar Japanese
rate of 4.6 per cent annually for the period 1926-1939.
Until around 1958 many observers attributed the
high rate of growth mainly to the postwar recovery. A
government economic survey of 1958 stated that since the
economy had recovered rapidly, the future growth rate
would be considerably lower. Ironically, shortly after
ward the economy started an extraordinarily rapid expansion
with the result of nearly doubling the GNP in real terms
in a matter of six years (1959-1964).
Table (I-l) shows that among the western developed
countries, with the exception of Italy, West Germany, and
Austria, there was a general rise in the rate of growth dur
ing 1960-65 as compared to the preceding period of 1955-60.
The success of the leading countries in attaining more
rapid economic growth may have had favorable repercussions


















































































Developing Economies (Tokyo: Japan
Research Center, 1907), P.4.
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among the other advanced economies of the world. Both in
West Germany and Austria the growth rate has recently
declined as the postwar recovery factor gradually diminished,
In the case of Japan, the growth rate during the period of
1960-65 showed no noticeable decline from the preceding
period. This would appear to suggest that her high rate of
growth depended not only on postwar recovery factors but
also on some other factors peculiar to Japan.
While many of the advanced countries have succeeded
in attaining growth, there has not been much improvement in
the case of developing countries, except in a few instances.
Considering the fact that the absolute levels of income and
output are very low and that population is increasing much
faster in developing countries, gaps between them and the
advanced countries in per capita Income and output are
likely to widen still more. However, the fact that at least
a few of the developing countries have succeeded in raising
their rate of growth considerably in recent years, as shown
in Table (1-2), is a promising sign.
Table (1-3) shows the annual rate of growth of GNP
in Japan in terms of current and constant prices. As seen
from this table, the rate of growth in constant prices shows
fluctuations from a high rate of 15.5 per cent to a low rate
of 3.7 per cent. It seems that the changes in the rate
of growth correspond with the approximate four-to-five
-6-
TABLE (1-2)
RATES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (GNP IN REAL TERMS) OP
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

























































Source: Saburo Okita, Causes and Problems of Rapid
Growth in Postwar Japan and Their Implications
for Newly Developing Economies (Tokyo: Japan
Economic Research Center, 19£>7) > P. 5.
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year business cycle. It Is noteworthy that even at the
bottom of the cycle, a 3 to 4 per cent growth rate was
maintained.
With the above-mentioned high rate of growth, the
level of income and output has risen rapidly. As Table
(1-3) indicates, the per capita national income rose from
162 dollars in 1952 to 694 dollars in 1965.2 Similarly,
during the corresponding period, the GNP rose from 17
billion dollars to 84 billion dollars.
In rough measure, Japan's per capita national
income In 1965 was about half that of West Germany and
Prance, and about one-quarter that of the United States.
Compared with the developing countries in Asia, however,
Japan's per capita national income is several times higher.
As compared to Germany, or Prance, while Japan's per
capita output is about half, its population is about double,
so that Japan's total economic output is approaching that
of those countries. As is shown in Table (1-4), in 1964
Japan ranks, in terms of GNP, number five among non-communist
countries of the world. If the USSR were included it would
come second to the USA. The economic output of China
2
Converted from Yen into US dollars on the basis of
































































Conversion into dollars based on official exchange
rate.
♦Population at mid-year, U.N. Demographic Yearbook,
1965. "
**Including West Berlin.
Source: Saburo Okita, Causes and Problems of Rapid Growth
in Postwar Japan and Their Implications For Newly
Developing Economies (Tokyo: Japan Economic
Research Center, 1907), p. 6.
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(mainland) is uncertain. If we assume their per capita
national income to be about 100 U.S. dollars, and their
population to be 750 million, China's national income is
around 75 billion dollars, which is slightly larger than
the corresponding figure for Japan in
Sources of Rapid Growth
As indicated in the preceding section, postwar
economic growth in Japan is outstanding, compared both
internationally and with her own historical record. The
reasons for such a rapid growth are a matter of great
interest to both Japanese and foreign observers. It is
the purpose of this chapter to analyze the causes for
this rapid growth as systematically as possible.
The phrase "vicious circle" has often been used in
connection with the obstacles in developing underdeveloped
economies. It has also been referred to in connection with
the balance of payments dilemma and other difficulties of
some of the more advanced economies. Contrarily, postwar
Japan presents a case where several favorable factors have
worked together in accelerating growth, and this process
may be called a "virtuous circle."
Broadly speaking, the causes for rapid growth or
the factors of a "virtuous circle" may be grouped into the
following four categories:
-11-
1. Postwar recovery and reforms
2. Semi-backwardness of economic structure
3. Policies and attitudes
4. International environment
In the following pages a detailed account of the
above factors will be presented.
Postwar Recovery and Reforms
Under this category there are three major factors:
1) recovery from the deep trough of economic activity due
to defeat in the war; 2) postwar reforms which have
revitalized the economy; and 3) abandonment of colonies
and reduction in military expenditures.
Recovery from the Trough
At the end of the Second World War, economic activity
came to almost a complete standstill, and the level of
industrial production was only a fraction of the prewar
level. In the course of recovery existing facilities were
available and with a relatively small additional investment
production increased substantially. Even agriculture was
in serious dislocation during the early postwar years
because of a lack of fertilizers and implements, although
the rural population bulged considerably due to the
disappearance of employment opportunities in urban areas
^During 1946-51, industrial production rose
averaging 29 per cent annually.
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and to several million repatriates from former overseas
colonies, including the demobilized servicemen.
By around 1955, ten years after the end of the
War, per capita national Income recovered to the 19^5
level. The immediate recovery factor gradually diminished
as time went on, and the other factors have become more
important at later stages. However, some economists
argue that in measuring the recovery not only the absolute
levels of production and income should be taken into con
sideration but also a comparison with the long-term growth
trend.
Postwar Reforms
Some of the postwar reforms, although they
were introduced under the pressure of occupation authority,
have had favorable impact on economic growth. Land reform,
encouragement of the labor union movement and the dissolu
tion of zaibatsu-^ were the major items. Land reform, for
example, stimulated farmers to introduce better methods of
production, as well as to improve their living standard.
The labor union movement, although it brought about some
TS.g., Shunichi Ichimura.
5zaibatsu were the large-scale industrial,
financial and commercial enterprises which had grown up
in the years before World War II.
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confusion, as a whole was a stimulant, through its demand
for higher wages, for better management and higher
efficiency. The dissolution of zaibatsu, although its
implementation was much mitigated at a later stage, had
a stimulating impact on Industries. Even the purge of
business leaders provided chances to introduce new blood
into management. Loss of the war and the reforms which
followed paved a new ground for starting competition from
scratch and invigorated the entire business atmosphere.
The departure from the past glory of Empire has
reduced various internal and international commitments.
Abolition of nobles, disbandment of army and navy,
cancellation, of government internal debts through inflation--
these events have also contributed directly or indirectly to
a more vigorous economic activity. Because of war defeat
people were more easily convinced of the necessity for
harder work, austere life and larger savings. Professor
G.C. Allen wrote:
The disaster that has overtaken her former policy
was so complete that she was impelled to set out on a
new course undistracted by regrets for past ambitions.
She may have been fortunate in being left with only a
single rational choice in 194-5* the acceptance of
temporal political subordination and co-operation with
her victors in economic rehabilitation. Once she had
crossed that threshold she seems to have allowed no
regret for the past to haunt her journey into the
new world."
G.C. Allen, Japan's Economic Expansion (London:
Oxford University press, 19&5).> P. 2bl.
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Abandonment of Colonies and Militarism
As the result of defeat, Japan abandoned all
her colonies and part of her older territories. She also
lost her so-called "sphere of Influence"—Manchuria and
North China. It was rather fortunate for Japan to have
lost colonies when, in many parts of the world, colonies
were turning from economic assets to economic liabilities.
Moreover, the rising tide of nationalism would have made
it impossible anyway for Japan to maintain colonies.
Around 1935 Japan was investing about 3 per cent of her
national income in her overseas colonies and sphere of
influence. Moreover, maintaining colonies entailed sub
stantial military expenditures. In preway years, during
the relatively normal and peaceful period of 193^-36,
Japan was spending about 7 per cent of national Income
for military purposes. After the war, because of the
occupation policy of demilitarizing Japan and the new Consti
tution which prohibits the use of military forces as a means
of solving international disputes as well as the anti
militaristic feeling of the people prevailing in the country,
expenditures for defense have been substantially reduced to
the level of around 1.5 per cent of the national income. The
security Treaty with the United States is another factor in
decreasing defense cost by dispensing with expensive major
-15-
weapons. If we assume the postwar saving of military
expenditure, as compared to prewar years, to be about
6 per cent of the national income and that this saving
is used for constructive investment, then the additional
7
rate of growth would be about 2 per cent annually.
As Professor Chiro Nakayama maintained:
One of the remarkable facts which should be borne
in mind is the sharp decrease in the amount spent on
defense. Under the postwar Peace Constitution, Japan
is not authorized to have any armed forces. Needless
to say, we have the Self Defense Forces which
correspond economically to the armed forces of prewar
time. But the expenditure on these PorcesRis far
less than the former military expenditure."
For example, in 19^0, spending on goods and services for
military purposes by the central and local governments
combined amounted to a high rate of 63.8 per cent.
Admittedly, the year 1940 was an exception owing to the
preparation for war, and the burden of such expenditure
may have been lighter before this date. But it cannot be
denied that a large proportion, about 50 per cent on the
average, of government expenditure was for military purposes.
After the war the proportion decreased sharply. The
defense expenditure in I960, for example, represented only
5.9 per cent of the whole amount of money spent by both
7
Assuming capital-output ratio as three.
Ichiro Nakayama, Industrialization of Japan
(Honolulu: East West Center press, 19b5), P. 9.
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the local and central governments. The money formerly
spent on defense was used either to meet the increasing
consumption or to provide for expanding investment. It
may be safely considered that the main part of this sum
g
was employed for investment. We can see from statistics-^
that the rate of private fixed investment to the GNP in
creased from an 8.8 per cent of the average in 1946-1951
to a 16.1 per cent of the average of 1956-59. Of course
it would be wrong to conclude that the increase in invest
ment depended solely on the decrease of defense expendi
ture, but it is certain the latter has contributed much to
that effect, which in turn, accelerated economic growth in
10
Japan.
Semi-Backwardness of Economic Structure
Japan's economy, though highly developed in many
ways, still retains various elements of backwardness and
this semi-backward stage of development has produced
conditions conducive to rapid growth. In view of the recent
experience in Japan, some of the newly developing countries
may also succeed in the future in creating a favorable
combination of factors for economic growth. In the course
^Ichiro Nakayama, Industrialization of Japan
(Honolulu: East West Center press, 19b5), pp. 9-10.
l°Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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of transition from an underdeveloped to a more developed
stage of the economy, there Is a possibility of realizing
a process of "virtuous circle" accompanied with an
explosive, rapid economic growth.
A more detailed account with respect to Japan's
case is given under the following headings: (l)
technological catch-up, (2) high productivity and low
consumption, (3) abundant supply of labor.
Technological Catch-up
Throughout the history of Japan's modernization
since the early Meiji period, the importation of foreign
technology played a crucial role In promoting economic
progress. This happened again In the course of postwar
development. During and shortly after the War, Japan was
separated from the technological progress of the outside
world. As contacts with foreign countries were restored
the import of "know-how" from highly developed countries
Increased sharply. The postwar Investment boom—in
particular, that of 1959-1964—was based mainly on the
importation of technology and its application in the actual
production process. The large gap which existed after the
War between foreign and domestic levels of technology and
the resulting catching-up process stimulated investment
and promoted rapid economic growth.
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Such a gap, or even a much larger gap than in
Japan's case, exists in many of the newly developing
countries, and this forms one of the most promising
factors for the future possibility of faster growth in
these countries. So far, in Japan, the quality of labor,
the accumulation of capital, the social atmosphere, and
other basic conditions have been, favorable for the
effective absorption of foreign technology. Also, in
many instances, the process of adaptation of imported
technology to local condition has been conspicuous. In
importing "know-how," sometimes selections were made to take
advantage of local conditions and such selections were often
made not by the conscious policy of the government but by
the working of market forces.
Enterprisers are keenly cost-conscious in introducing
new lines of production and they attempt to achieve the most
profitable factor combinations. In the earlier history of
its modernization Japan was forced, under the pressure of
western powers, to abandon autonomy in fixing tariff rates
on imported commodities. The maximum tariff rate was set
at five per cent ad valorem and it was only in 1899 that
Japan regained tariff autonomy.11 With this lack of tariff
Masao Baba and Masahiro Tatemoto, "Foreign Trade
and Economic Growth 1868-1937/' Working paper for the Inter
national Conference on Economic Growth-Case study of Japan's
Experience (Tokyo; September, 19bb), P. 4.
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autonomy, Japanese industries were compelled to be cost-
conscious and aware of international competition right from
the beginning. On top of this historical background, some
of the basic industries which had been heavily protected by
the government because of military considerations were also
exposed after the War to outside competition. Under such
circumstances, cost factors were taken into serious con
sideration in importing and applying "foreign know-how."
Another characteristic of Japan's technological
progress has been the constant improvement on imported tech
nology. On many occasions, because of such improvements,
factories built originally with foreign design reach in the
course of time a much higher output than the designed capacity
set by the foreign supplier of "know-how." Thus, blast
furnaces of the iron and steel industry originally designed
for a daily output of 1,500 tons actually operate at 2,500
ton capacity. A synthetic rubber factory with a designed
capacity of 50,000 tons a year operates at 70,000 tons.
With such improvements, cost of production, in particular,
capital cost, was considerably reduced. Sometimes in
newly developing countries officials believe simply in
buying the most modern equipment existing in the world
without giving due attention to cost aspects and to the
factor combination of capital and labor. Sometimes they
also overlook the fact that the most modern equipment can
-20-
become obsolete in a few years' time if the ability for
continuous improvement is not developed in due course.
High Productivity and Low Consumption
Rapidly improving technology, brought about both
by the aggressive importation of "know-how" from abroad and
by the continuous effort of research and development in the
country, has resulted in a rapid rate of improvement in the
overall labor productivity of the nation as a whole. On
the other hand, the consumption pattern has remained
relatively unchanged until recent years. The combination
of modern, efficient production and the traditional pattern
of consumption has created a favorable condition for a high
rate of saving which, in turn, provided capital necessary
for rapid expansion. In addition, change in the consumption
patterns is a relatively gradual process and when productivity
improves rapidly a gap appears between production and
consumption due to the time-lag effect of the latter.
Therefore, the rapid economic growth itself has tended to
raise the rate of saving and Investment.
Concerning the productivity-wage relationship, a
similar development is noticeable. In most branches of
industry, productivity was rising rapidly while wages were
rising at a somewhat slower rate. This was more conspicuous
during the 1950's and early 196O's though in recent years
there have been signs of reversing this trend. Table (1-5).
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TABLE (1-5)




























































Agency, Government of Japan.
The gap between the rise in productivity and the
rise in wages in. favor of the former created a margin for
reducing the cost of production. It enabled enterprises to
earn a higher profit margin and to make larger plough-back
investments, which in turn resulted in a rapid expansion of
industrial output. The productivity-wage gap has also
strengthened the competitiveness of Japanese products in
the world market, as most of the exporters of industrial
manufactures have been experiencing a faster rise in wages
than in productivity and, consequently, a rising labor cost.
Moreover, as the result of active investment, most of the
equipment and machinery in Industries is new and modern and
this again has strengthened export trade. Stronger export
trade has provided the larger imports necessary for meeting
the growing domestic demand without incurring serious balance
of payments difficulties. The above is a typical case of the
"virtuous circle" mentioned earlier. Table (1-5) gives some
statistical background on export expansion and the
productivity-wage relationship. It indicates that during
1958-65 the productivity-wage relationship was generaLy
favorable for Japan and that exports expanded at the highest
rate among industrialized nations. The export price index
declined 6 per cent during this period and this also
reflects factors other than wage-productivity relationship,
such as improved technology and more efficient equipment.
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Abundant Supply of Labor
One of the reasons for a favorable productivity-
wage relationship is the relative abundance of the labor
supply as compared to other industrial nations. Although
this abundance has been gradually diminishing since around
i960, unlike other industrialized countries, the labor
supply is not a major limiting factor for growth. In the
case of West Germany, a full employment economy was reached
around 1958, and the growth rate has come down from about
8 to 5 per cent per annum, mainly because of the labor
shortage. Japan has not yet reached the 1958 German labor
condition.
Before the War, Japan was known for its chronic over
population, especially for over-crowded agriculture with an
average of only two acres of land per farm household. The
agricultural labor force was nearly 80 per cent of the total
at the beginning of modernization and it came down to about
40 per cent before the Second World War. Throughout
these several decades, the labor force in agriculture stayed
at about the same level, while the total population was
doubled from 34.8 million in 1873 to 71.4 million in 1940.
After the war, the population increased sharply due to
repatriation from overseas, a temporary postwar baby boom,
and a sharp decline in the death rate. The pressure of
overpopulation was felt much more seriously than in the
-24-
prewar days, and at that time many people felt it was
almost impossible to support a rapidly increasing popula
tion on the four major islands with an area of 370,000
square kilometers (l4l,000 square miles).
Contrary to the above pessimistic outlook, the actual
development so far has been a rapidly expanding demand for
labor and for the first time in Japan's history, signs of
labor shortage have appeared since around i960. However,
a large number of people are still working in low-productivity
sectors, and there still exists a large reserve of under
utilized labor in agriculture, small-scale industries, small
retail shops, etc. The shift of a worker from a low-
productivity sector to a high-productivity sector will
sometimes result in a several-fold increase in his output.
Therefore, the expansion of modern industries with high-
productivity employment has contributed substantially to
the high rate of economic growth.
In the highly developed countries, although there are
sufficient numbers of high-productivity employment oppor
tunities, the labor supply is the major bottleneck limiting
growth. In the underdeveloped countries, although there is
surplus labor in most cases, the quality of labor has not
been sufficiently developed to equip workers with the
necessary educational and training background required by
modern employment. Moreover, the total accumulation of
capital is not large enough to provide every worker with
-25-
high-productivity employment opportunity. In the case of
postwar Japan, the combination of an abundant supply of
labor with an adequate quality of labor and the continuing
process of capital accumulation in the form of productive
assets has been realized.
Another characteristic of the labor supply condition
is its age structure. Because of the relatively recent
decline in death rate and the sharp postwar decline in birth
rate, the work-age population accounts for a larger portion
of the total as compared to other countries. In highly
developed countries, because of the longer average life
expectancy the proportion of the older age group is generally
high. In the underdeveloped countries, because of the shorter
life expectancy in the recent past and a sharp rise in live
births after the war, the younger age group population
expanded much faster than the total. Therefore, compared
with both developed and underdeveloped countries, Japan has
a relatively high ratio of work-age population and low-ratio
of both old-age and childhood population. This means a
larger portion of the population is gainfully employed with
a smaller number of dependents and family members. In this
respect, the age composition, of the population of present-
day Japan is favorable for economic growth. Table (1-6)













































Figure for Japan (1995) is based on the population
projection prepared by the Population Research Institute,
Ministry of Welfare; Figure for Japan (1965) is estimated
by Welfare Ministry, June i960—figures for other countries
are obtained from United Nations statistics.
Source: Saburo Okita, Causes and Problems of Rapid
Growth in Postwar Japan and the Implication
For Newly Developing Economies (Tokyo: Japan
Economic Research Center, 19^7)* P. 26.
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Policies and Attitudes
In realizing a rapid economic growth, the attitude
of the people ingeneral—or more specifically, that of
enterprisers, workers, farmers, citizens, and others—toward
economic problems has much significance. Government policies
are also important elements. It is not always easy to draw
a clear-cut line between the government policy and the
attitude of the people. Moreover, some of these issues
have already been dealt with in the preceding chapters.
Here, however, the following items will be discussed in
connection with the rapid economic growth: (l) The "economy
first" principle; (2) Production oriented policies; (3)
Expansion of heavy industry; (4) Export promotion; (5) Use
of the price mechanism and planning; (6) High rate of
saving; (7) Financial mechanism.
The "economy first" Principle
After the serious disillusionment about the policy
of militaristic expansion and the misery and devastation
people experienced due to the bankruptcy of this policy,
the Japanese people in general have tended to assume
an "economy first" attitude. The energy of the people,
dissipated in military actions in the past, is now concen
trated upon economic rehabilitation and development.
Business is now attracting the best brains among young people
-28-
and the ability and energy of scientists and engineers is
now fully applied to the production and improvement of
civilian commodities.
In the field of international policy as well,
"Japan has been following a policy of 'economic interest
first.' On many international issues Japan has been taking
a passive attitude, examining their impact on her economy
and protecting her immediate national interests. This
attitude has been effective in achieving a rapid recovery
and an expansion of domestic economy, and while Japan's
economy was weak and struggling to recover fromi the after
effects of the War, such an attitude was more or less
accepted by foreign nations. Gradually, as the economic
accomplishments of postwar Japan have become widely
recognized abroad, more is being expected of Japan in the
formulation of international economic policy and in the
discharge of her responsibility as one of the world's
leading trading nations."12
Production Oriented Policies
It has been only recently that people have
started arguing that the government should pay due attention
to the consumers' interest in the betterment of housing and
environmental facilities. The criticism has been raised
1 Saburo Okita, "Japan and the Developing Nations, "
in Contemporary Japan, Vol. XXVII, No. 2, 1965.
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that in the past government policies were too heavily
oriented toward production and neglected the problems of
the peoples' daily life. It is true that so far, while
industries, agriculture and trade have had strong voices
in influencing government policies, consumers as a group
have not had such influence.
In the early postwar years, rehabilitation of the
basic industries such as coal, iron and steel, fertilizers,
electricity, and food production was the major concern of
the government. Then policies such as the modernization of
basic industries, the establishment of new industries,
including petrochemicals, export promotion, the protection
of agricultural production, etc., attracted government
attention. Monetary policy and banking practices have also
been heavily oriented toward production, as exemplified
by the fact that so far Japanese bank loans are extended
mostly to manufacturers and traders and not very much to
consumers.
Thus, "production first" policy, though it has had
some undesirable social repercussions, has certainly
contributed to the rapid growth of production.
Expansion of Heavy Industry
During the early period of modernization, the
most popular motto frequently used by the leaders was "to
build a rich nation and a strong army." The government took
-30-
strong leadership in promoting industrialization, and one
of the important features at that stage and later, until
the Second World War, was the combined effort of promoting
industries in the private sector basically on a commercial
basis, such as the silk and cotton textile industries, on
the one hand, and the building and expansion of industries
mostly heavy industries, irrespective of cost and profit
ability, from military considerations, on the other. After
the war, though military considerations disappeared, the
policy to expand heavy industries has been persistently
followed. The reason for this was probably the recognition
by the government and industry of the fact that for higher
income and greater GNP, the expansion of heavy industries,
particularly the machinery industry, was considered essential,
Heavy industries were sharply expanded before and during the
war in order to meet military need, and the struggle of those
industries to survive as commercial enterprises in the
postwar years may have been another reason for the improve
ment and expansion of heavy industries. As a result,
machinery and equipment necessary for the rapid expansion
of industrial production have largely been supplied by
domestic industries. This had a dual effect favorable to
growth: first it saved foreign exchange otherwise necessary
for importing capital goods from abroad; and second, it has
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multiplied the total industrial output by creating demand
at various stages of production, from raw materials to
finished products. In many of the present newly
industrializing countries and also in prewar Japan, a
sharp rise in imports of capital goods and a subsequent
shortage of foreign exchange has been and is one of the
major bottlenecks in attaining rapid industrial expansion.
The expansion of heavy industry has had another important
advantage; in foreign trade, Japan's export expansion was
facilitated by the fact that it was in line with the
expansion of world trade as a whole, in which exports and
imports of heavy industry products are expanding much
faster than the average.
In 1965 products of heavy and chemical industries
accounted for 6l per cent of the total export trade of
Japan and this compares very favorably with the figure of
41 per cent in 1955.
Export Promotion
Export trade has been considered for many years
a vital necessity for the survival of the Japanese economy,
Looking back on the progress of Japan's export trade, we
may classify it into the following stages: (l) export of
primary commodities such as copper, silver, tea, cocoons
and even rice; (2) export of semi-manufactured items, in
particular raw silk; (3) export of light-Industry products
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such as cotton textiles, low price; (4) export of light
Industry products to high Income markets with the improve
ment in quality although still considered cheap and low
quality commodities in such markets; (5) export of high
quality consumers• goods and the beginning of the export
of heavy industry products to both low and high-income
markets; (6) weakening exports of labor-intensive products,
due to a growing labor shortage, higher wages, and
competition from newly industrializing countries.
The above stages in the development of export trade
may provide some useful reference for newly developing
countries. In many of these countries foreign trade has been
considered something of marginal importance or a necessary
evil, due partly to the memory of past exploitation by the
colonial powers. In some countries there is also a feeling
of defeatism concerning the possibility of export expansion.
India is one of these, and in the course of twelve years
(1953-1965) export trade expanded only from 1.2 to 1.7 billion
dollars while Japan's exports increased from 1.2 to 8.5
billion during the same period. Without expanding export
trade a country cannot find the foreign exchange necessary
to import capital goods for development. The establishment
of industries for import substitution often resulted in
larger Imports of equipment, semi-processed items, food, and
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other consumer goods, instead of reducing imports. It is
true that the developed industrial nations are still
putting various obstacles against larger exports by newly-
developing countries, as pointed out in the first meeting
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
held in Geneva in 1964. At the same time, developing
countries may find some usefulness in learning Japan's
process of export expansion, particularly of manufactured
and semi-manufactured items.
Use of the Price Mechanism and Planning
In 1949 rampant postwar inflation was put to an
end, and a single exchange rate of yen (l U.S. dollar=360
yen) was fixed. With this stabilization program, physical
controls were removed one after another, and the market
mechanism and free enterprise system started functioning.
With the outside stimulus created by the Korean War demand
and the internal conditions conducive to vigorous competi
tion, economic recovery was much accelerated.
A price mechanism and market forces are the important
factors to effectuate appropriate resources allocation. In
newly developing countries, there is sometimes the necsssity
of utilizing market forces as a means of attaining effective
resource allocation. Without protection from outside
competition, new industries may never be established. Over-
protection, on the other hand, may perpetuate high costs and
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lead to inefficient use of resources. In this regard, newly
developing countries may introduce in their economic plans
targets of cost reduction and schedules for reducing pro
tection from foreign products.
TO
As for economic planning in Japan since the first
postwar plan of 1955* new plans have been adopted by the
government every two or three years. Although the govern
ment has economic plans, they are indicative plans in nature.
Frequent revisions of the plan are partly due to the
realization of rapid growth exceeding the planners' estimates
and partly due to the recognition that planning in a market
economy should have sufficient flexibility to meet changing
conditions. Plans should be utilized as guidelines for
current decision-making by providing future perspectives,
and for such purposes as a rolling or shifting type of plan
may have relevance. Economic planning in Japan has also
served the purpose of indicating a set of long-range policies
in meeting with possible future problems and bottlenecks
and of coordinating different objectives pursued by
individual government departments in the light of an overall
economic framework and future prospect. It has served also
13
More detailed account of planning experience is
given in the following paper: Saburo Okita and Isamu
Miyzaki "The Impact of Planning on Economic Growth in Japan,"
Development Plans and Programmes, OECD, 1964.
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for educational purposes in orienting people to a forward
looking and rational-thinking attitude on the various
economic and social issues.
High Rate of Savings
As is often pointed out, postwar Japan's rate of
savings is extremely high compared both to her prewar record
and to other countries of the world. Gross savings were
over 30 per cent of the GNP in recent years, while in other
developed countries they are around 20 per cent. Personal
savings as compared to personal disposable income has been
nearly 20 per cent in Japan and this figure again compares
very favorably with about 10 per cent in other developed
countries. Moreover, as shown in Table (I-?), the rate of
savings has been increasing in the course of postwar years
although it seems to have reached a plateau after 1961.
For example, gross savings, 23.4 per cent of the GNP in 1953
rose to 37.4 per cent in 1964. Incidentally, this rising
trend of the savings rate was a perplexity for planners as
they repeatedly underestimated the rate of savings in pre
paring government economic plans and accordingly projected
a lower rate of growth than was actually realized.
Of the total gross savings, about 50 per cent is
from private corporations (including depreciation allowances),
30 per cent from personal savings, and the remaining
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TABLE (1-7)
GROSS DOIVESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION AND SAVINGS
Gross Domestic Personal Savings
Capital Formation as % of Personal














Source: Saburo Okita, Causes and Problems of Rapid
Growth in Postwar Japan and the Implications
for Newly Developing Economies (Tokyo: Japan
Economic Research Center, 19&7)> P. 26.
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20 per cent from government savings; and compared with other
developed economies, the share of personal savings is
relatively high. A detailed analysis will be given in
Chapter 2.
The Financial Mechanism
Observing the financial aspect of Japan's rapid
postwar economic growth, economists have often pointed out
that the financial mechanism in Japan has been in a continued
state of over-loan. It has been a general practice among
Japanese enterprises to depend heavily upon commercial banks
for the supply of funds required for their business expansion
and for commercial banks in turn to borrow heavily from the
central bank. As a consequence, the percentage of the
companies' own capital in their total operating funds has
greatly fallen while that of borrowed funds has risen.
This practice has made the financial position of Japanese
firms very unstable and commercial banks have often furnished
more credits to enterprises than they could normally afford.
For this reason, foreign bankers and entrepreneurs have
often criticized the management of Japanese banks and enter
prises as unsound and unorthodox. However, it should be
noted in this connection that equipment investments have
expanded so sharply that the funds needed for such investments
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could not be supplied from the companies' own capital in an
orthodox way. On the other hand, the market for long-term
capital has been relatively undeveloped and a major portion
of the bank deposits made by individuals has been channeled
to industries through banks. It is also true that Japanese
bankers and industrialists usually expect that the govern
ment or the central bank will do something to help them if
the financial or industrial circles encounter a serious
problem which they think Is too difficult to solve for
themselves. Such an attitude stems from the historical
background—the fact that the Japanese economy has emerged
from the undeveloped into the modernized stage under the
strong leadership of the government.
However, such a financial mechanism and practice
has made it possible for the central bank to adjust business
fluctuations effectively by raising the official discount-
rate and also by exercising the so-called window guidance
which Implies a central bank control over commercial banks
regarding the volume of credit supplied to Industries by
the banks. When the domestic economy has sharply expanded
and imports have increased, aggravating Japan's balance of
payments position, the central bank exercises strong
influence on industry by restricting loans to the private
banks. Then the nation's balance of payments quickly turns
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into the black. If there is a recession, and if Japan's
international receipts exceed payments, the central bank
relaxes monetary restrictions and usually a business up
surge follows.
In short, the state of over-loan has enabled the
Japanese economy to grow at the maximum rate possible until
the balance of payments position deteriorates and is then
rectified through tight money measures taken by the central
bank. This form of financial operation has constituted an
Important factor contributing to the rapid economic growth
in Japan. In 1965* however, the monetary relaxation by the
central bank failed to cause an economic upswing. So the
government resorted to a substantial tax reduction and to
the issuance of government bonds for the first time since
the end of the war in order to stimulate business recovery.
International Environment
The international environment has been rather
favorable to Japan's economic resurgence. The various
factors which have worked favorably to her economic
rehabilitation are: 1) occupation policy; 2) the Korean
War; 3) international cooperation in expanding trade.
Occupation Policy
The Occupation policy followed by the Allied Powers
immediately after the Wars' end placed emphasis on measures
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for preventing Japan from regaining military strength.
The Imperial Army and Navy were disbanded and plans were
drawn up (although later abandoned) for reparations pro
grams aimed primarily at the removal of heavy industrial
equipment, thought to be a part of potential military
strength. In the early stages of the Allied Occupation,
Occupation authorities were responsible for the prevention
of famine and diseases but not for the economic rehabilita
tion of Japan.
A directive given by the United States Government
to General MacArthur at an early stage of the Occupation
states:
(A) You will assume no obligations to maintain, or
have maintained, any particular standard of living in
Japan, and
(B) That the standard of living will depend upon
the thoroughness with which Japan rids itself of all
military ambitions, redirects the use of its human and
natural resources wholly and solely for purpose of
peaceful living, administers adequate economic and
financial controls and cooperates with the occupying
forces and the governments they represent.1^
The economic democratization policy which was
followed by the Allied Occupation, in company with its
demilitarization policy, also aimed at reforming the social
and economic structure of Japan in order to avert a potential
threat from Japan in the future. Such rigid Occupation
Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme
Commander for Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, U.S.
Government, November 1, 19^5
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policies were gradually relaxed, and the Allied Occupation
came to assist Japan's economic rehabilitation and to bring
Japan back to the community of free nations. The aid
furnished by the United States to Japan gradually increased
until 1950 when the Korean War broke out and Japan started
to obtain special-procurement dollar revenue. Economic aid
from the United States to Japan totalled 2,01b million
dollars by 1952 when such aid was terminated.
During the Occupation, the United States repeatedly
sent teams of experts to Japan to offer advice on the
modernization of Japanese industries. The recommendations
and advice given by the American experts during those years
on the reform of various systems were not all fit for the
actual situation of Japan, but it should be admitted that
the occupation carried out extensive reforms and injected
new blood into the Japanese society and economy, and thereby
laid the foundation for the subsequent vigorous economic
activities. It should also be admitted that during the
several years immediately following the war, when the
Japanese economy was at its lowest ebb and when Japan had
very little to export, the aid furnished by the United
States enabled Japan to import the commodities required for
her economic rehabilitation.
The Korean War
With the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950,
Japan started to earn foreign exchange through the special
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procurement of goods and services required by the U.S.
armed forces. At the same time, the commercial export
substantially expanded. Thus, Japan became able to import
necessary commodities, with her export and special-
procurement earnings. In 1952 and 1953, nearly one-half
of Japan's imports was paid from her special procurement
receipts.
When the Korean War ended special-procurement
earnings directly connected with the Korean War decreased,
but Japan continued to gain procurement earnings in
subsequent years from the U. S. armed forces stationed in
Japan and her neighboring areas which maintained an annual
average of nearly 500 million dollars. It cannot be denied
that during those years when Japan's commodity exports were
still limited, her foreign-exchange earnings from special
procurement substantially facilitated her imports of
materials vital to her economic rehabilitation.
International Cooperation in Expanding Trade
During the inter-war period many countries imposed
restrictions on their imports and formed themselves into
economic blocs. Consequently, international trade was
greatly hampered, and this state of affairs intensified
the political tension among the world powers and finally,
from the costly experience of World War II, the world
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powers of today have been cooperating in relaxing
import restrictions and in expanding international
trade. Although this trade policy has not necessarily
been extended effectively toward less-developed
countries, trade among advanced nations has steadily
expanded at an increasingly higher rate and has
served as a favorable factor in promoting Japan's
export trade. Japan's exports are mostly manu
factured goods because she produces very small
amounts of raw materials for export. Taking
advantage of this international trade situation,
Japan has been able to develop and expand her
overseas markets by offering quality products at
low prices. The government decided in i960 to
liberalize commodity imports, because people came
to realize that Japan could enjoy more benefits
from the international division of labor and could
further expand her Import and export trade by so
doing.
Living Standard^
Evidence of Japan's rise in living standards




4. Social security progress
Consumer Spending
During the economic growth process, personal con
sumption improves noticeably in both quantity and quality.
Showing some lag with the growth of gross national product,
the consumption level has been increasing steadily every
year since 1955, with the 1962 record about 60 per cent
above 1955. This rise of the consumption level has accel
erated the elevation of consumer standards through the
decrease of the portion of food expenses in total ex
penditures and the rise of housing expenses and other
expenses, such as education, culture, recreation and
social expenses. Of the food expenses, those for
cereals declined and those for meat, milk products,
eggs, beverages, fruit, confectionery, etc., increased
gradually enriching the consumption standard.
Improvement in the standard of living is further
reflected in the market popularization of consumer goods.
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According to a Prime Minister's office survey on per house
hold diffusion rate of durable consumer goods for 1964 (all
households, excluding those employed in agriculture,
forestry and fishing) each household owned 1.0 television
sets, 0.8 electric washing machines and 0.6 electric
refrigerators. The figures for automobiles (passenger cars),
which have become increasingly popular annually, was one in
every 14 households. Pianos were owned at the rate of one
in every 22 households and air conditioners, one in every 42.
Housing
The Government, under its housing programs, has
completed many housing projects and helped private citizens
build their own homes (Table 1-8).
Per Capita Income
Japan's per capita income in 1963 exceeded 500
dollars, still far from 1,200-1,300 dollars in the leading
Western countries (Table 1-9). However, services and daily
necessaries cost much less in Japan. The Economic Planning
Agency estimates that the retail prices in Japan is on the
average about 50 per cent lower than the United States, and
this means that the equivalent of a dollar spent by a
Japanese consumer buys more than a dollar spent in the United
States. Therefore, the consumption level in Japan may be
considered much bigger than what the statistics suggest.
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TABLE (1-8)



























































































(1) Houses built by local governments and
municipalities under state subsidies.
(2) Settlers1 houses, government employees1
houses, etc.
Source: The Japan Development Bank, Facts and Figures
on the Japanese Economy (Tokyo: 1964), P. 135.
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TABLE (1-9)
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OP PER CAPITA INCOMES
Per Capita Income
Index Japan's 1962




















Source: The Japan Development Bank, Facts and Figures
on the Japanese Economy (Tokyo! 1964), P. 12.
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Social Security Programs
In Japan the social security system has developed
remarkably since World War II.
Now, nearly the entire population is receiving
benefits from the health insurance system. The Government
has been striving to extend the health insurance systems1
scope and increase the amount of benefits. As many as
39 per cent of workers actually employed are receiving
benefits from the welfare annuity system. The total amount
of benefits of this system in the fiscal year 1965 amounted
to 48.157 million yen, more than 7 times the 1955 figure.
Another major social security system is livelihood protec
tion, designed to relieve poor families. The household
beneficiaries of this system amounted to 657,000 households
in the fiscal year 1966.
In the fiscal year 1966 the expenditure for social
security amounted to 726,000 million yen or approximately
3 per cent of the total national income.
Capital Formation and Savings
Charles Kindleberger maintains that:
In a fundamental sense, capital formation is
possible only when a society produces a surplus
of consumers' goods sufficient to satisfy the
wants of the workers engaged in producing capital. -*
■'■-'Charles P. Kindleberger, Economic Development
(New York: 1965), P. 50.
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He continues by explaining that in more developed societies
the problem is transferring savings from current production
in order to form capital. Such savings are essentially
consumption goods produced but not consumed by their
producers, that is "capital goods produced and offset by
the savings of their producers, which reduced their demand
for consumers1 goods."1" Furthermore,
Beyond the fact that the developed countries have
more capital per person, they are adding to these
stocks more rapidly than the underdeveloped countries.
Whether measured against existing stocks of capital
or against national incomes, capital accumulation
proceeds faster in the already developed countries. . .
A country must maintain a steady flow of new investment
if, year in and year out, it is to realize its real
income potentialities.1/
Table (1-10) shows that countries with a high growth
rate, such as Japan, Israel and United Arab Republic have a
small marginal capital-output ratio, and the low-growth-rate
countries, such as the Federation of Malaya, Columbia and
Ceylon have a large marginal capital coefficient. The
question of why capital is more effective in Japan is too
complicated to deal with fully here. For Japan, the
explanation may be that its efficient and abundant
labor makes capital more effective. Furthermore,
l6Ibid., P. 50.
■^Norman S. Buchanan and Howard S. Ellis, Approaches
to Economic Development (New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1955), P. 41.
-50-
TABLE (1-10)
RATE OP GROWTH OF REAL OUTPUT AND RELATIONSHIP
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Source: U.N., World Economic Survey, 1966, Part I,
Chapter 1, p. 15.
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that Japan's economy was for the most part created by giant
industry and mass production is probably another explanation
for its small marginal capital coefficient.18 Table (1-10)
also shows that, given other conditions, the bigger the part
of the national product that is ploughed back and the more
effective is investment, the bigger is the growth rate.
A very important factor in capital formation is strong
investment demand. Consequently, the incentive for investment
plays a very important role in economic growth. Moreover,
the main reason that many nations have enjoyed rapid economic
growth is their strong propensity to invest, as in Japan
during the postwar period.
However, it is also true that even though there may
be a strong propensity to invest, it does not entail that
the rate of capital formation is necessarily high. Other
factors, such as materials and equipment, also must be
considered.
For a nation with a fixed resource, part of these
resources usually goes into production for consumption and
part goes into production for capital. In the case of
increasing investment, thrift must increase and resources
must be channeled from producing consumers' goods to
producing capital goods. Assuming full employment, if
Ttyochiro Tachi, "Economic Growth and Savings," In
Saving White Paper, ed. by Savings Campaign Committee (Tokyo:
1963)V P. 33.
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thrift does not increase, when demand investment increases,
the price level will rise or imports will increase.
Consequently, inflation will occur. When salary and wage
earners receive less real income and real consumption
decreases, forced savings will come into play. Experience
and theory teach that when this takes place, economic growth
follows. It is significant that during postwar rehabilita
tion, Japan employed a conscious policy of forced savings.
Kenneth Kurihara remarks that,
Inflation has the effect of shifting real income
in favor of profit-takers against interest-earners,
real investment in capital equipment will be greater
than financial investment in stocks and bonds—to the
longrun benefit of capital accumulation and economic
development.1"
However, he qualifies this by pointing out limitations on
development through inflation and warns against over-
20
optimistic inferences from his conclusions. It is also
important that savings by inflation causes a rise of wages
and this fosters further inflation and cost-push inflation.
As a result, there is the risk of bringing about the collapse
of the monetary system through a loss of confidence in the
country's currency. On the other hand, raising prices
interferes with voluntary saving- and, in order for a
1^Kenneth K. Kurihara, The Keynesian Theory of Economic




country to attain economic stability and growth, an increase
in voluntary savings is indispensable.
Finally, in the 1950's, countries having a high
saving ratio, had only a small increase in price level as
in Japan, but a large increase in Philippines. Possibly
this indicates that the high saving ratio has not been
raised by inflation.21
National Savings and Investment by Sectors
During the period 1954-57, the excess of investment
over saving in Japan was small, Table (I-ll). On the other
hand, in the corporate sector, this excess was very large.
Savings substantially exceeds investment in the personal
sector. A sectoral breakdown of the gross domestic savings
shows that the personal sector, including household and non
corporate business, accounts for one half, corporate business
28 per cent, and the government 22 per cent. On the other
hand, the corporate business sector accounts for 47 per cent
of the gross domestic investment, the government 30 per cent,
and the personal sector 23 per cent.22
21
Shu-Chi Yang, "Capital Supply and Economic Growth:
Sources of Saving," a paper submitted to the International
Economic Association Round Table on Economic Development with
special reference to East Asia (Japan: I960), p. 36.
^United Nations, "Case Studies of Economic Growth,"




DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INVESTMENT AND SAVING
IN JAPAN (1954-57)
Investment by the corporate
business sector as percentage
of total gross investment 51
Saving by the personal house
hold sector as percentage of
total gross saving 48
Source: United Nations, "Savings in Economic Growth
of Postwar Japan," Economic Bulletin for Asia
and the Far East, Vol. XI, No. 2, September
I960, P. 2.
Two-thirds of the excess of savings over investment
in the personal sector is channeled into financial assets,
and one-third into tangible assets. Deposits with the
financial institutions account for over four-fifths of
the former, the rest flowing to securities investment. The
importance of indirect financing is a peculiar feature in
the financial flow linking investment and savings in Japan.
Here, however, it would be incorrect to assume that if a
complete set of financial accounts were available, one could
trace the channels through which a yen's worth of saving
is transferred from the saver to the person who does the
investing.
If one group saves by accumulating cash balances,
while another group invests by drawing them down, it
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is tempting—but misleading—to say that the currencey
authority provides the means for transferring savings
from one group to another, thereby permitting invest
ment to take place. If the savers accumulate cash
balances (claim on the Treasury, perhaps) while the
investment is financed by bank lending, which the
banks effect by reducing their liquidity, then there
is no financial connection between the saving and the
investment (although, of course, they must be equal
ex post).g3
In addition, savings are not necessarily always invested and
some investment may not be matched by current saving, because
some saving may be hoarded and some investment may be
financed by dishoarding or by creation of additional
money.2^
A high growth rate tends to accompany a high saving
rate. This growth is supported by a high investment rate,
which in turn is supported by an expansion of indirect
financing, especially banking credit. It should also be
noted that a high voluntary saving rate has been stabilizing
Japan's economy to avoid vicious Inflation in spite of the
extension of a tremendous amount of banking credit.
Table (1-12) indicates the increase in banking credit by
year in millions of yen.
23w. Arthur Lewis, The Theory of Economic Growth
(Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin, 1955), P. 315.
24united Nations, "Savings in Economic Growth of
Postwar Japan," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Par East
Vol. XI, No. 2, September I960, P. 215.
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TABLE (1-12)
INCREASE IN BANKING CREDIT IN JAPAN (1958-65)
Fiscal Y = million 1965 = 100









Source: The Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics





The high rate of personal savings in postwar Japan
is a well-known phenomenon. An international comparison
in Table (2-1) of savings In leading Industrial countries
for the decade of the 1950's shows that the rate of
personal savings In Japan, expressed as a ratio either to
the Gross Domestic Product or to personal disposable income,
Is conspicuously higher than that in other countries. The
high savings propensity in Japan cannot be viewed as a
temporary phenomenon in the course of recovery and
reconstruction from the war. In Table (2-2) which
illustrates shifts in the savings rate in Japan since 1950,
for example, we notice that even after 1955* the year in
which the recovery came to an approximate close, the savings
ratio to the GNP and the average propensity to save, with
respect to disposable income of all personal categories as
well as to wage-salary earners' household Income, continued
to increase at a marked pace.
The rapid increase in personal savings during
1955-1961 is one of the reasons why the Japanese economy
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TABLE (2-1)
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE

































































(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California press, 1966), P. 158.
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TABLE (2-2)








































































Economic Growth in Japan,
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University or
California press, 1966), P. 159.
Ratio of personal savings to total personal
disposable income. Kokumin Shotoku Hakusho,
fiscal 1961, p. 102.
"Calculated by the following formula:
average propensity to save = I - (consumption
expenditures) plus (consumption expenditures in kind)
t (real income) plus (income in kind) - (non-
consumption expenditures)
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could grow at an accelerated pace without experiencing
hyper-inflations or catastrophic balance-of-payments
crises, despite the fact that private plant-and-equipment
investments have continued to expand at the extraordinary
rate of 29.6 per cent per annum (the 1955-1961 average)
since 1955, Therefore, an analysis of the causes of the high
rate of personal savings may aid us in understanding Japan's
postwar growth.
We shall discuss the factors in the following order:
High Rate of Growth in Personal Income
The high rate of growth in real personal disposable
income and, in the case of wage-salary earners' household
income, the rapid increase in the weight of extra income
(bonuses) in their income are believed to be one of the most
significant causes of the high personal savings rate in
postwar Japan.
In Japan after 1955, income has risen faster each
year than was generally anticipated, and each year the
high rate of growth has been considered as a temporary
phenomenon.1 In such a situation the increased portion
■'■Japanese economic policy makers, as well as econo
mists, have repeatedly maintained that Japan's accelerated
growth is merely a short-term phenomenon. Projected growth
rates under different Economic Plans (5 per cent under the
Economic Recovery Plan; 6.5 per cent under the New Long-Range
Economic Plans and 7.2 per cent under the Income-Doubling
Plan) were all severely criticized as overly optimistic.
Even among general consumers a tone of pessimism was
prevalent concerning the future of the Japanese economy.
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of income is not regarded by the consumers as part of
their "permanent income" and therefore their saving is
prone to increase. In this sense we may hold that the
higher-than-anticipated growth rate raised the level of
saving, which in turn helped accelerate economic growth.
Since 1955 the rapid rise in the level of income has been
accompanied by a pronounced increase in the extra-income
ratio, principally among workers' households.
It is also a unique custom of Japanese corporations
to pay employees regular bonuses, as a profit-sharing
system, at the end of each year or quarter. Before the
war, bonuses were restricted to white-collar workers with
an emphasis on supervisory personnel, but during the postwar
period the system has been extended to cover all workers in
large corporations as well as the increasing number of
workers in small- and medium-size firms. Consequently,
the ratio of bonuses to workers' annual income, together
with their saving, has risen rapidly. Table (2-3) illustrates
the relationship between saving and extra income in real
disposable income.
"Extra income" here is defined as bonuses, overtime
allowances, extra-work allowances, and other income paid
only in a given month; but it consists largely of bonuses.
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TABLE (2-3)
EXTRA INCOME AND SAVING OF WAGE-SALARY
EARNERS' HOUSEHOLDS
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Source: Komiya Ozaki, Postwar Economic GrowthJLn Japan
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California press, 1966), P. 171.
aIn 1955 prices.
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There is a close relationship between the amount of
total extra income earned by workers and the amount of their
saving in a given year. The relationship between the two,
however, differs from city to city.
The above statistical facts do not imply that
literally all extra income is saved by workers. According
to monthly statistics of the Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (Kakei Chosa), in those months with little extra
income it is only the extremely low-income households whose
saving becomes negative, and in those months with a large
extra income (e.g., December and June) expenditures show a
sizeable increase. It is also inappropriate to regard extra
income to be in the nature of Priedmanian "transient
income," and the rest of income as "permanent income."
For one thing the bonus in Japan is a rather fixed and
anticipated element in the total annual income of workers.
The so-called Life-Long-Employment and Annual Proportional-
Wage-Increase Systems in Japan tend to stabilize the
employment relationship as well as wage levels, and it is
probable that the annual income of Japanese workers
fluctuates far less than it does in the United States and
other countries. Therefore, we cannot argue that the rate
of saving for workers' households is high in Japan because
the "transient-income" ratio is large. The recent rise in
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workers' saving should perhaps be best interpreted as a
reflection of the expanding lag in the level of consump
tion relative to income, for in the course of Japan's
accelerated growth the extra-income ratio has increased
at a persistently rapid pace along with a faster-than-
anticipated increase in real income.
The Life Cycle of Income and Saving
The unique features of life-cycle patterns in
income and consumption, together with the undevelopment
of consumer finance in Japan, seem important reasons for
the high rate of personal savings.
The pattern of the life cycle of income and saving
differs from country to country. There seems to be some
evidence that the unique properties of this life cycle,
as well as several demographic characteristics of postwar
Japan, have encouraged the hjgh rate of personal saving in
the country.
The conspicuously high rate of saving among the
old seems unique to Japan, and is presumably a result of
the Annual Proportional-Wage-Increase System. In Table
(2-4), which compares wage gaps in terms of age brackets
in Japan and West Germany, the relatively high income of
the old in Japan is clearly indicated. The pattern of
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TABLE (2-4)



































Source: Komiya Ozaki, Postwar Economic Growth in Japan
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University or
California press, 1966), P. 172*.
XWage indexes by age. For blue-collar workers,
wages of those younger than 30 as 100; for white-collar
workers, wages of those younger than 25 as 100.
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income distribution in terms of age brackets for West
Germany represents those of European countries and the
United States. While there exist some notable differences
in the distribution of income in terms of age between
Japan and Western countries, we should expect far less
differences in "consumption needs" in terms of consumers
age brackets. Therefore, since consumption needs decline
with age, the households of the aged, whose level of
income remains high, are bound to save more. But we must
note that, in Japan, those who are older than 65 or 70 are
typically absorbed into their children's households, thus
presumably contributing to society's saving by lessening
social overhead expenditures which the maintenance of
independent households would necessitate.
The state of consumer finance and housing mortgages
in Japan is closely related to the preceding observations.
Even if the income level of the young is low, easy access
to consumer finance, housing mortgages, and other debt
instruments tends to encourage their consumption; their
saving may easily become negative with a lowering effect
on the overall rate of personal savings. In Japan the
system of consumer finance is still in a state of under-
development, and the amount of mortgage loans on houses,
other than a limited amount from the Housing Loans Fund
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of the government, has been close to zero. Consequently,
a sizeable saving accumulation usually precedes the
purchase of consumer durables and houses in Japan.
In addition to those differences which we have
observed in the life cycle of income and saving in Japan
from those in Western countries, there may perhaps be some
other differences that have determined the high rate of
saving in Japan.
Social Security
An international comparison reveals no evidence of
a correlation between the ratio of social-security
expenditures to the National Income and the rate of
personal savings. The contention that the Japanese personal
savings rate is high because of the underdevelopment of
social-security programs is not supported by empirical
evidence. But the relative absence of social-security
expenditures may be regarded as one important factor
responsible for the high level of government savings.
According to another frequently encountered theory,
the rate of saving in Japan is high because, in the absence
of an extensive social-security system, people are motivated
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to save by a sense of apprehension about illness, post-
retirement needs, and other contingencies. Table (2-5).
The following are points in support of the argument
that insufficient social security is one cause of the high
rate of saving In Japan: (l) the rate of saving in the
middle low-income bracket in Japan is notably high relative
to that in the United States; and (2) according to the Bank
of Japan's Public Opinion Survey on Savings, July 1961
(Chochiku ni Kansuru Yoron Chosa), a large proportion of
interviewees gave as the purpose of their saving (a) "to
provide for illness and other contingencies" (a reply
concentrated among those in the middle low-income bracket)
and (b) "for security after retirement." However, analysis
of the low-income sectors involves numerous comparability
problems, such as the definitions of income, the unemployed,
households of the aged, irregular-income earners, and the
like, so that it is extremely difficult to make a meaning
ful, international comparison of the bracket. A more
relevant question to ask is why the rate of saving in the
low-income sector approaches zero but fails to be negative
in Japan, in contrast to the usual negative savings in
the corresponding sectors in the United States and Great
Britain. We must await further research to learn whether
this phenomenon is related to social security.
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TABLE (2-5)
THE RATIO OF SOCIAL-SECURITY EXPENDITURES
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of California press, 1966), P. 175.
Government transfer payments to households in
this column consist mostly of social-insurance and social-
security payments; also included are some non-social-
security items such as scholarships, research fellowships,
retirement compensations for government employees, and
the like.
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In any circumstance it is not easy to apply an
econometric method to test the impact of social security
on saving. However, if some major changes in the social
security system take place within a relatively short period
of time, we might be able to conduct a meaningful correla
tion analysis in order to draw a somewhat definitive
conclusion as to the influence of social security on
saving. My own impression is that social security affects
saving, not so much through the consumers sense of
"insecurity" under a particular social security system in
a given country, as via its effects on fiscal burdens and
government saving or on the tax system to finance its
programs, which in turn influences personal savings.
Other Causes
The following "other" hypotheses are harder to
prove or disprove econometrically than those which we
have examined in the preceding sections.
The Pigou Effect
War and inflation have caused extensive destruction
and the disappearance of assets owned by consumers, as well
as a drastic decline in property value or real income of
many individuals. Given the fall of the asset-income
ratio after the war, it is conceivable that the rate of
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saving in Japan has been high because of consumers efforts
to restore the optimal asset-income ratio realized before
the war. This hypothesis allegedly applies to liquid
assets as well as to houses and other physical assets.
An empirical testing of this idea is exceedingly difficult
because one must somehow assume an optimal asset-income
ratio for each individual consumer or group of consumers.
The Traditional View on the Virtue of Parsimony
The rate of saving in Japan was high not only after
the war but during the prewar years as well. Therefore
many people contend that the traditional emphasis on a
frugal life is one major explanation of the phenomenon.
Granted that such a view deserves careful study, especially
from the standpoint of the sociology of religion, an
attempt to treat it as a direct explanatory variable for an
economic phenomenon is a sign of irresponsibility and
defeatism. According to the available National Income
statistics for the Meiji era, the ratio of Net National
Saving to the NNP is estimated to have been only 3.8 per
cent during the last two decades of the nineteenth century,
strongly suggesting that the rate of saving was not as high
then as in later periods. Even if it were true that the
spirit of parsimony circulates through Japanese blood vessels,
the economist's task is to analyze how and by what
-72-
economic conditions the ethos of frugality transcends




Sources of Corporate Investment Funds
Charles Kindleberger remarks that "when the private
entrepreneur is the channel of investment, it does not
follow that he is the sole decision-maker In the process."
This implies that the entrepreneur usually has to employ
borrowed or external capital, and in some countries his
readiness to take the risk may be less significant than
the decision to lend to him. In the United States, however,
corporations have largely freed themselves of dependence
on banks, characteristic of the decades before World War I.
On the other hand, this has not been true for Japan.
During the period 1951-58, corporate investment
comprised 70 per cent of gross private capital formation.
However, in this period, total corporate saving amounted
to 53 per cent of total investment fund resources. Indirect
financing, especially bank credit, played an important role.
y Shinohara, Growth and Cycles in the
Japanese Economy (Tokyo: Klnokuniya, 1962), p. 49.
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Even before the war., corporations relied heavily upon
financial institutions because private saving was deposited
in such institutions. After the war, this practice became
more widespread. In 1958* bank credit (both short-terra
and long-term) amounted to 31 per cent of corporations
total outside borrowing, while in other leading indus
trialized countries, a larger part of the funding require
ment was met by self-financing and the capital market.
Therefore, the degree of corporations' dependence upon
bank credit is far less than in Japan. There has been
also a trend that the long-term bank credit constitutes
a major portion of industrial funds. In the case of the
principal corporations in Japan, retained profits and
reserves have comprised about 40 per cent of corporate
saving. The rest, about 60 per cent, has been depre
ciation allowances. The ratio of gross saving to value
added has moved upward. One exception is the decline
of the period from the latter half of 1957 to the first
2
half of 1958. This was due mainly to a business recession.
^United Nations, "Savings in economic Growth of
Postwar Japan," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far
East, Vol. XI, No. 2, September, 19bO,~TT~2~5.
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One reason for the rising gross savings ratio for
the indicated years has been an increased appropriation for
depreciation. This has been a persistent policy regardless
of business fluctuations. This is not the case with re
tained profits, which vary according to changes in business
conditions. Tables (3-1), (3-2) indicate the percentage of
gross saving to value added increases with the size of
corporations, but from 1954 to 1957 it has been increasing
for corporations irrespective of size. As classified by
Industry groups, the percentage in the field of production
is very high as compared with that in the field of
distribution.3
Pattern of Corporation Finance
The size and type of business enterprises and
business fluctuations influence greatly the amount of
excess of investment over intra- and intercorporate saving.
Beyond borrowing from financial institutions, corporations
can meet their excess in investment through intercorporate
credits and till cash reserves are available for financing
investment. In big corporations, the volume of excess of
investment is larger than the increase in borrowings,
3united Nations, "Savings in Economic Growth of
Postwar Japan," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far
East, Vol. XI, No. 2, September, 19bO, P. 25.
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TABLE (3-1)
RATE OF GROSS SAVINGS TO VALUE ADDED IN
JAPANESE CORPORATION
(IN PERCENTAGES)
Amount of Paid-in 1953-58




5.6 5.0 6.2 8.7 10.4 8.1 7.3
(Petty Business)
2 o- 9 9
8.9 10.4 9.3 10.6 12.1 10.8 10.4
(Small Business)
10.0- 99.9 (Medium-
11.1 11.2 10.8 13.2 15.8 13.7 12.6
sized Business)
100.0 and above
14.1 14.9 16.1 18.4 18.1 16.3 16.3
(Big Business)
All 10.9 11.4 12.1 14.5 15.3 13.2 12.9
Source: United Nations, "Savings in Economic Growth of
Postwar Japan," Economic Bulletin for Asia













low 2.6 2.4 2.6 3.3 4.4 3.7 3.2
2.0- 9.9 3.5 3.9 3.1 3.6 4.0 3.8 3.6
10.0-
99.9 3.6 3.6 3.3 4.0 5.0 3.8 3.9
100.0 and
above 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 4.9 4.0 4.5
All 3.7 3.8 3.7 4.5 4.8 3.9 4.1
Source: United Nations, "Savings in Economic Growth
of Postwar Japan," Economic Bulletin for Asia
and the Par East, Vol. XI, No. 2, September
1950, P. 25.
except late in a business recession and early in a business
recovery, whereas small corporations find the opposite. In
the manufacturing industry, the same trend is observed in
the latter part of a business upswing. ECAPE has reported
that "the past economic growth has been effected mainly by
big corporations."
In big corporations, investment always exceeds
saving. Small corporations, however, increase their gross
investment less than large corporations do and usually
depend on self-financing. In contrast to large corporations,
because their credit worthiness is smaller, they are more
willing to have high cash liquidity. Cash holding among
small corporations is too great to settle outstanding
business transactions. Small corporations like to maintain
high liquidity. When money is tight, they reduce their
investment. Concerning intercorporate credit moves, in
periods of business upswing, credits flow from small
corporations to large ones, and from trading firms to
manufacturing industries. During periods of recession and
recovery, the reverse takes place.
4
Ibid., P. 26.
5C.N. Vakil and P.R. Brahmananda, "Capital: Capital
Supply and Growth—Source of Savings," Kenneth Berrill (ed.)
Economic Development with Special Reference to East Asia
(London: MacMillan, 19bH), P. lay
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Determinants of Corporate Saving
Not only does savings from profits comprise a
significant part of total saving, but it also affords
the most reliable prediction concerning total saving.
In Japan, the gross profit rate of manufacturing corpora
tions has been, on the average, slightly above 14 per cent
of capital employed for the period 1954-57.7 Table (3-3)
shows that value added in corporate business has steadily
increased since 1953 for all enterprises. On the other
hand, except for 1958, the proportion distributed to wages
has decreased gradually. This has had a great influence
on the increase of the savings rate.
The percentage of gross saving in value added in
the medium and small enterprises is lower than in the
big enterprises, which is the natural result of a
higher proportion of the value added going to wages
in the medium and small enterprises where labor is
employed intensively.9
The gap in wage differentials between large, medium and
small enterprises has also been widened when small and
medium enterprises paid lower wages. Furthermore, medium
and small enterprises increase their saving capacity by
introducing more productive technology and by improving
management internally and cooperative arrangements
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externally, Japan pays higher financial expenses but lower
dividend payments than the U.K. and the U.S.A, but since
its corporate tax is relatively low, Japan, like the U.K.,
maintains an equal level between the reserve rate and
gross profit, including depreciation.
Enterprises' Propensity to Invest and Business Fluctuation
The optimistic outlook of Japanese enterprises,
especially large ones, warmly encourages them to invest in
domestic and overseas markets. This is significant for
the propensity to save. Furthermore, wide variations in
profits during business fluctuations similarly influence
corporate saving. High equipment investment, together
with firm consumer demand during the 1957-58 recession
brought about a continuously increasing tendency to provide
for depreciation, the high saving in expanding enterprises,
and an increase in the saving capacity of small and medium
enterprises.
Corporation Tax and Economic Growth
During the decade of the 1950's, approximately
21 per cent (on the average) of the Japanese GNP has
been allocated for Gross Private Domestic Capital Formation
Table (3-4). As we have already observed, the high rate
of personal saving has been one of the significant factors
responsible for such a high level of private investment.
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TABLE (3-4)
THE RATIOS OP GROSS DOMESTIC PRIVATE CAPITAL FORMATION,
CAPITAL CONSUMPTION ALLOWANCES, AND CORPORATE RETAINED
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California press, 1966), P. 174.
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However, about one-half of capital formation has been
financed by gross savings within the business sector;
the average ratios of retained earnings of corporations
and of capital consumption allowances to the GNP during
the 1950's were 4.2 per cent and J.6 per cent, respectively.
Capital consumption allowances have shown a steady upward
trend in their ratios to the GNP. A similar trend was
seen in the ratio of depreciation to sales among major
9
business enterprises in the period 1951-1955.
The ratio of corporate retained earnings to after
tax corporate incomes was, on the average, as high as about
80 per cent on the basis of National Income statistics;
consequently, its ratio to the GNP was also notably high
relative to those in other countries.
^According to a survey by the Mitsubishi Economic
Research Institute, the average depreciation-sales ratio
among some 600 firms registered at the Tokyo Stock Exchange
rose from 1.84 per cent in the first half of 1951 to 3.60
per cent in the second half of 1955. The ratio by types of
business also showed a similar upward trend. (Mitsubishi
Economic Research Institute, Kigyo no Seicho to Shuekisei
(1962), p. 101, Table 4-1, and p. 104, Table 4-3.)
CHAPTER IV
GOVERNMENT SAVING AND FINANCE
System and Scale of Government Financial Activities
The budget of Japan's central government includes
the budgets of general accounts, special accounts and
various governmental agencies. Furthermore, there are
also treasury investment and loan programs formulated
concurrently with the national budget for every fiscal
year and operated according to the national economic policy,
These programs are using private fund resources. There
fore, they cannot be considered part of the government
sector in the true sense of the word. However, these
programs are too significant to be neglected when dis
cussing government finance, since they amount to about
one-fifth of the general account. In addition, the total
administrative budgets of local government are comparable
to the general account.
In Japan, the importance of the activities of the
central treasury are limited. For the period of 19^6-65,
the government purchase of goods and services was 9-9.2
per cent of the GNP. It is obvious that the government
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purchase of goods and services showed a tendency to
decline; it fell from 11.5 per cent in 1946 to 9.8 per
cent in 1965. Table (4-1) This owes much to the
maintenance of a balance in the central treasury since
1949 when the postwar economic rehabilitation was about
completed, as well as to the policy of tax reduction which
was made several times in recent years in order to avoid an
increase in tax burdens and expansion of the national
budget. Owing to these developments in the recent re
markable growth of the Japanese economy, the treasury
has played only a secondary role, while the increases in
private savings and their flow into productive investments
have been dominant. Besides this figure is relatively low
considering other industrialized advanced countries. As
shown in Table (4-2), Japan's government purchase of goods
and services accounts for only 9 per cent of GNP, while
those of other industrialized countries reach at least 14
per cent of GNP. The tax ratio to national income has also
been low—i.e., in i960 and 1961, two-fifths lower than other
industrialized countries as observed in Table (4-2). The tax
system of Japan is based on the equity principle and direct
taxes—mainly individual and corporate income taxes. The
Shoup Report emphasized the importance of income taxes for
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RATIO OP TAXES TO NATIONAL INCOME IN JAPAN






































































"National taxes" includes government monopoly
profit.
Source: The Japan Development Bank, Facts and Figures
on the Japanese Economy (Tokyo:1964), p. 145,
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recommended the lowering of maximum rates in the income tax
structure and the introduction of a wealth tax (i.e. the
net worth tax to be levied against high property-income
earners). These were meant to alleviate the harmful
effects upon production and investment motives of
excessively high progressive income tax rates.
Government saving and investment never played too
important a role in Japan's postwar economic growth, aside
from the period of postwar economic chaos. In contrast,
the increase in private saving and its flow into productive
investments have always been Important. Because of needs,
such as providing social overhead, capital and strengthening
national defense and because of political reasons, the
government's budget has been expanding. To maintain a
stable growth is partly the responsibility of fiscal policy.
The rate of saving is largely influenced by economic
changes. The "permanent income hypothesis" seems to apply
most aptly to the relationship between income changes
resulting from economic fluctuations and the workers and
farm households. Since the war, private consumption in
Japan has shown little reaction to short-term income changes.
This is believed to be due to the general tendency of private
persons to determine their permanent level of consumption
on the basis of the peak level of Income during the current
period. As a consequence, the rate of saving generally
tends to increase during a business upswing and decrease
during a business downswing.
Treasury Savings
The total balance of various accounts at the end
of the fiscal year 1965 was 1958 billion; approximately
30 per cent of the general account. One thing one has to
note is that "surplus" and "inventory finance" are only
accounting concepts. In reality, they are not necessarily
used for capital accumulation but as resources for current
expenditure of special accounts. Even the Fund for
Strengthening Economic Foundations is not used for any
special purpose.
During the fiscal years 1947-1965, the government
current surplus averaged 31 per cent of total government
income. Surplus by year is shown in Table (4-3). A
great part of these surpluses have been channelled to
capital formation in the government sector, which con
sists of the Central Government, public corporations and
local authorities and certain fields of the private sector.
Treasury Investments and Loans
In Japan, the government absorbs a large quantity


































































































Source: The Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics of
Japan (Tokyo: 1964), p. 324.
The Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics of
Japan (Tokyo: 196b), p. 2yy
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invests it in both public and private sectors according to
the national policy. The main fund sources are private
savings at the government's disposal in the form of the
Trust Bureau Funds (the principal source is postal saving);
Post Office Life Insurance Funds; and the proceeds of bonds
issued by local government and by government enterprises.
Resources such as the reserved yen proceeds from the sale
in Japan of U.S. aid goods and proceeds from the Special
Tax Reduction Bonds are of negligible amount. Since 1957*
no new transfer has been made from the General Account.
This transfer has been the principal resource of the
treasury's own saving. "At the end of March 1958, private
savings supplied 70 per cent of the fund resources of the
Programs, foreign debts 12 per cent, and public saving
and others 18 per cent. The corresponding percentages
at the end of March 1951 were 52, 39, and 10 respectively."
Investments and loans under the programs made to
key industries have been decreasing in importance, while
there has been an increase in the importance of investments
and loans made for social overhead capital and investment
and loans in medium and small enterprises or agricultural
sectors. This indicates private financial institutions
are taking care of private enterprises and the Treasury
■^-United Nations, "Savings in Economic Growth of
Postwar Japan," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East,
Vol. XI, No. 2, September 19bO, p. 31.
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Investment and Loan Programs have gradually shifted
priority to special fields which private financial
institutions cannot afford to accommodate on a commercial
basis. Coming back to Japan, one sees the total out
standing amount of Treasury investments and loans was ¥ 400
billion at the end of fiscal 1958. It was ¥ 285 billion
for 1952. The share of the public sector in the totals had
increased from 42 per cent to 6l per cent during the period,
while that of the private sector fell correspondingly.
In a word, as the economy grows, the public enterprises,
agricultural, and medium and small enterprises will rely
2
more upon the Treasury Investment and Loan Programs.
United Nations, "Savings in Economic Growth of
Postwar Japan," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East,
Vol. XI, No. 2, September 1950, p. 32.
CHAPTER V
SAVING INCENTIVES
The pattern of savings in Japan's economy has been
analyzed quantitatively. Furthermore, the trend of saving
In each economic sector and the relationship between
savings and the financial structure have been examined.
Attention here Is devoted to the saving incentives In Japan.
Unincorporated Enterprises
National income statistics not only Indicate the
rate of personal saving but also reflect the saving rate of
the personal enterprises. Even though corporate enterprises
have already developed in Japan, Income generated from
unincorporated enterprises are still high. "During 1951-57*
it amounted to 39 per cent of the national income, as
compared with only about 10 per cent in the United Kingdom."
This class of small businessmen is less subject to the
"demonstration effect" and has a high propensity to save.
They cannot easily distinguish themselves by lavish
Shu-chl, "Capital Supply and Economic Growth:
Sources of Saving," a paper submitted to the International
Economic Association Round Table on Economic Development with
special reference to East Asia (Japan: i960), p. 2*J-.
consumption and only can distinguish themselves by earning
more and more money, and therefore tend to have a high
propensity to save and to invest.
Property - Income Ratio
The Japanese average propensity to save is high
because the shares of property income and the income of the
self-employed are large in Japan. For example, we come
across the thesis in the U.S.'s World Economic Survey, i960,
that the ratio of the sum of property income and the income
of the self-employed to total personal income, and the rate
of growth in real disposable income, are the two most
effective variables in explaining international differences
p
in the average propensity to save. It is, however, rather
misleading to combine property income and the income of
the self-employed; the two should be treated separately.
Table (5-1) gives the ratios of net property income con
sisting of rent, interest, dividends, and the like,
received by individuals to personal income in selected
countries.^ The ratio in Japan increased rapidly from
3.1 per cent in 1950 to 8.1 per cent in i960. Even if we
2U.N., World Economic Survey, i960, pp. 27-28.
^Ta be exact, we must deduct from personal income
imputed rent and imputed interest (all of which, by defini
tion, are spent on consumption) so as to derive income paid
only in cash. There is, however, no such data available.
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TABLE (5-1)
RATIOS OF PROPERTY INCOME AND INCOME OP THE SELF-
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Does not include personal dividend income.
cDoes not include interest on government bonds.
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take the values for 1955-1960, the property-income ratio
was lower in Japan than in. the United States, Belgium, and
Canada. Furthermore, there is no visible correlation
between the ranks of property-income ratios and average
propensities to save. A comparison of prewar and postwar
figures in Table (5-1) shows that the property-income
ratios were much larger before the war, ana yet there is
no indication that the decline in the ratio during the
postwar period has significantly affected the rate of
saving. In the case of Japan, her prewar ratio was above
20 per cent, one of the highest in the world, but the ratio
has drastically decreased after the war due to the
agricultural reforms and the zaibatsu dissolution.^
Notwithstanding the postwar decline in the ratio, however,
the Japanese average propensity to save (out of personal
income) has been much higher after the war than it was
during the second half of the 1920's.
Average propensity to save (out of disposable income)
in 1938, is calculated from U.N. National Income Statistics,
1938-1948, were 6.7 per cent; Australia; 4.5 per cent; Canada,
7.1 per cent; France, 5.2 per cent; Holland, 3.2 per cent,
Great Britain, 1.4 per cent; the United States and Great
Britain are the only countries in which the value has become
lower since the war. We must, of course, allow for the effect
of the depression on the 1938 prices, but the ratio of Net
Savings to Net National Products in accompanying table do not
reveal any indication of a declining tendency in the average
propensity to save.
^These changes in the factorial distribution of
income must have had some significant equalization effect
upon the size distribution of income.
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The foregoing examples are sufficient to illustrate
that the property-income ratio does not effectively explain
international differences in the average propensity to save.
Accumulation and Composition of Financial Assets
The outstanding features of the Japanese financial
system are reflected directly in the nature of accumulated
financial assets. An analysis of the movement of financial
assets is also an important means to understand the attitude
of the various groups of savers, such as corporations,
consumers, etc., toward their asset holdings. Based on
the statistics of flow of funds, such an analysis is made
below.
The amount of financial assets in Japan has been
expanding remarkably during recent years. At the end of
1958, it reached ¥ 31,019 billion, or 2.3 times that at
the end of 1953. A review of the variation of financial
assets holdings of each of the sectors during this period
shows that almost no change can be seen in recent years in
the proportion of the holdings of the financial institutions
sector to the total financial assets, which is naturally
high as a result of its important role in indirect financing.
In sectors other than financial institutions, the proportions
of the non-corporate and corporate sectors remain high,
while that of the government sector remains low. Especially
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in recent years, the non-corporate sector tops all others
in the expansion in asset holdings, while the proportion
of the government sector's holdings follows a downturn
Table (5-2).
As for total financial assets, an increase of 1.3
times was realized from 1953 to 1958. A breakdown of
financial assets by type shows that loans by financial
institutions constitute the most important item, followed
by time deposits (17 per cent in 1958), while securities
fare relatively poorly; this is a reflection of the
importance of the indirect financing system in Japan.
Inter-corporate credits, which in their outstanding amount
can compare with securities holdings, deserve attention.
Cash currency and demand deposits constitute the so-called
"money supply." Both cash currency and demand deposits
combined occupy about 12-17 per cent of the total amount
of financial assets, but the proportion tends In the long
run to decline slowly. Also notable is a rapid decline in
the proportion of cash currency, which dropped below one-
third of demand deposits at the end of 1958—i.e. in 1953
from 4.7 per cent to 3.0 per cent in 1958. Although the
so-called contractual savings, including trust and insurance,
do not have much weight, the amount shows a remarkable
increase in recent years from 33^ billion yen in 1953 to
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TABLE (5-2)
COMPOSITION OP REAL ASSETS AND FINANCIAL






National Capital 17,481 100.0
Fixed capital 15,099 86.4
Inventory 2,257 12.9































































Source: United Nations. "Savings in Economic Growth of
Postwar Japan, Economic Bulletin for Asia and
the Far East, Vol. XI, No. 2, September, I960
p. 38.
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1275 billion yen in 1958--i.e. an increase about 1.6 per
cent. Table (5-2). In summary, the structure of total
financial assets has been changed toward the more
sophisticated since 1953. A breakdown of financial assets
by sector shows little change except a minor shift from the
government to personal sector.
The composition of financial assets varies for
different sectors. As a matter of course, cash currency
and time deposits count much in the non-corporate sector,
and demand deposits and intercorporate credits in the
corporate sector. But it is worthy of note that about 30
per cent of the total amount of time deposits is held by
the corporate sector, since both long- and short-term
security markets (except the stock market) are not fully
developed in Japan and corporations are not used to holding
securities as part of their liquid assets. Moreover,
corporations are strongly inclined to maintain deposits
in financial institutions with a view to facilitating their
borrowing from them because of their large dependency on
such borrowing. Both of these considerations apply only
to Japan among the industrialized countries.
In the analysis in the preceding paragraphs,
financial assets included those of financial institutions.
When the financial institutions sector's holding is excluded,
-101-
the composition of financial assets naturally proves to be
quite different but the rate of increase therein during
recent years was about the same as that in the case of
total financial assets. The same rate exceeded the rates
of increases in real assets, trade volume and gross
national product Table (5-3). The higher rate of increase
in financial assets holdings of the economy, excluding the
financial institutions sector, was attributed chiefly to
the considerable increase in the holdings of non-liquid
assets, namely, financial assets other than cash currency,
demand deposits and intercorporate credits.
This fact can be easily understood by relating it
to the process of postwar inflation and subsequent stabili
zation. First, the movement of liquid financial assets
is closely related to that of business transactions. Over
recent years, when the process of early postwar inflation
was about completed, and prices had generally been
stabilized, inflationary demand for money disappeared, and
the demand for money at present is limited to the amount
necessary to meet the volume of normal business trans
actions. Furthermore, intercorporate credits have no
reason for expanding beyond the amount necessary to carry
out transactions. Changes in business conditions, especially
financial conditions, naturally bring out, in a short range,
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aIndex of gross transaction=wholesale price
index X shipment index.
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differences in movements of the volume of transactions and
liquid financial assets. However, these differences are
temporary, and liquid financial assets in a long range
increase parallel with the increase in trade volume as long
as no marked change is brought about in current commercial
practices. The increase in liquid financial assets also
exceeded that in gross national product, owing chiefly to
the increased differentiation of the economy.
Secondly, the increase in non-liquid financial
assets has also been speedier than that of gross national
product or gross transactions. The holding of such assets
has a great bearing on the motive for saving. There is no
reliable criterion for deciding where the absolute level
of the outstanding amount of financial assets and the out
standing amount of real assets should be balanced. But,
in a country such as Japan, where the past accumulation of
financial assets was sharply devalued after the war as a
result of inflation, a wide difference arose between the
values of accumulated financial assets and the price of
new purchases of assets in kind. The saver's preference
for financial assets naturally grew stronger than before in
the subsequent period of economic stabilization. This
phenomenon was observed most clearly in the non-corporate
sector. The ratio of non-corporated time deposits to
disposable income, which was 21.3 per cent in 1956, but
recovered to 58.4 per cent in 1958, is still far below
the 70 per cent level for the prewar days (1930).
There is no clear-cut explanation for the relation
ship between the individual's attitude towards asset
holding and changes in interest rates and other financial
conditions. However, in the non-corporate sector, there
is a strong tendency for assets to be transformed from
one type to another—as for example, an increase in stock
holdings and inventory investment while the rise in demand
deposits slowed down in the period of business upswing.
In recent years, there tends to be a general preference
for long-terra deposits, contractual saving, and the like,
which earn interest at higher rates.
There is an important problem of the effects of
financial asset accumulation or the preference for
financial asset holding on real saving, but not enough
information is available at present to clear up the point.
It can be safely said, however, that in Japan, financial
assets have power to recover the previous level, and the
increase in financial assets which continues at an almost
uniform rate is one of the factors supporting the current
high rate of saving.
Holding of Stock
As to the daily average of stocks traded in Tokyo
Stock Exchange, the First Section marked a 17-fold increase—
from 8 million stocks in 1955 to 135 million stocks in 1963.
This expansion is attributed to the fact that stocks have
become a profitable investment object due to the high rate
of dividends and the long-run capital appreciation, and
that public participation in the stock market has
increased due to the rise of income level.
Before World War II, stocks were held almost
exclusively by large holding companies. The trading market
for stocks was very speculative. After the war, however,
stocks were made accessible to the general public. Thanks
to the "democratization of securities," the stock market
now is an investment market for long-term funds. Investment
trusts, inaugurated in 1951* have recorded a rapid growth
in these few years, thus serving to encourage further the
popularization of stocks, and providing a channel to direct
individual savings to industrial investment. Individuals
and investment trusts hold about 60 per cent of stocks
outstanding, corporated enterprises 20 per cent, and
securities companies and financial institutions 20 per cent.
After World War II, stock prices indicated a marked
upward trend over the long-run, although with short-term
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ups and downs. In the three years from 1959 to 1961,
the boom was particularly conspicuous. Prom the peak
of the summer of 1961, however, stock prices plunged
sharply downward, reflecting the tight money conditions
resulting from the balance of payments deterioration,
lower corporate profits, the depressing effect of
capital increases on prices, etc.
New stock issues are made mostly by allotment
at par to shareholders. Recently, public offerings




Factors Causing Rapid Growth
The rapid economic growth of Japan can be noted as
the result of rapid industrialization. The stability of
the social structure, together with the system of values
of a family orientated society served as a general
foundation for such rapid industrialization and modern
ization. Thanks to this stability and continuity, Japan
was able to raise the necessary capital needed without
foreign aid, to attract a constant supply of labor to industry,
and to establish fairly good industrial relations notwith
standing the ever changing character of techniques and
organization. In short, the merits of the traditional society
were fully utilized for the purpose of industrialization.
By a careful review, three most significant factors
can be summarized as the key to Japanese economic growth.
However, it is also quite clear that those factors are
changing in character very rapidly. There has been a
tremendous change in the nature of the society which
supported the whole process of industrialization.
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As for the first factor, the supply of capital through
the high rate of savings, recent statistics seem to indicate
no remarkable changes. But there are some signs of a
fundamental changes in the consumption pattern which supported
the high rate of savings from personal incomes. The extent
of this change is difficult to assess objectively. But the
fact that a little more than half of all families in Japan
now have a television set while about two-thirds of families
have an electric washing machine may suggest the scale of
this change as well as its direction. We do not really know
whether Japan is already in the fifth stage of economic
growth, i.e. the era of high mass consumption in terms of
Professor Rostow. But it is certain that the change would
cause a corresponding change in the nature of the society,
at least in so far as it is an outcome of a change in the
values of the people concerned.
As for the second factor, the supply of labor, the
change in its pattern is more significant. For the first
time in the history of its industrialization, Japan has
experienced a shortage of labor in the Western sense. In the
coming ten years the degree of the shortage is expected to
increase owing to the decrease in the rate of population
growth. The trend of transfer of the labor force from
■^-Professor Rostoitf seems to answer this question in the
affirmative. See, W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth,
Cambridge, i960, p. 88. ~~ ™~
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agriculture to industry will continue for some while, for
the absolute number of workers in agriculture is still very-
high compared with that of advanced countries. But the
shortage of labor in general must have an important
influence upon the range of the shift, thus taking away the
advantages it had during the long period of development.
As for the third factor, the dual structure of the
economy, we have already noted that it is now disappearing
fairly rapidly. The wage differences between the large
firms and the small ones are not disappearing so quickly,
but they are being narrowed, thanks, perhaps, to the strength
of the trade unions since the war on the one hand, and on the
other hand to the generally favorable situation of the
economy as a whole. So the basis for low wages is not so
solid as it x^jas before the war.
All these changes in the long-term factors of growth
are in themselves the outcome of the success of industriali
zation. In so far as the three factors were based upon
the nature of the traditional society, the changes in their
character and in the degree of their contribution should be
accepted as such. What matters in the case of Japan in how
to compensate for those advantages of the society that are now
being lost. Indeed in this connection Japan is at a turning point,
Many advantages which once contributed to the speedy growth of
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the economy are now being looked upon as liabilities.
This is especially true with regard to the dual structure
of the economy. As has been indicated, this was the one
of the most important factors which supported the tempo of
growth. Yet today it is popular among Japanese economists
to say that it is a liability which should be eliminated
as soon as possible. Ways of looking upon the process of
industrialization as well as estimates of its achievements,
are changing rapidly in present day Japan. This is partly
due to the progress of modernization itself, and partly to
the democratization of postwar period. But it is important
to note this change of mood carefully, since it is a sign
of a change in the value judgments of the people involved
which in turn will bring a change in the characteristics of
the society at large.
The changes in the traditional society effected by
the process of industrialization can be traced in many fields,
Firstly, the dynastic elite which proved so effective in
launching industrialization has been changed into an ordinary
bureaucracy. The function of entrepreneurship has been
turned over more and more to private institutions. The
government which is still active in directing the course of
development, is now being forced to look after the social
welfare of the people more than before. Secondly, management
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is now shifting from its older paternalistic habits to more
rational practices. It is becoming increasingly burdensome
for the enterprises to assume responsibility for their
employees as in former times. The notion of lifetime
commitment still prevails, but competition in the world
market and the cost consciousness on the part of enterprises
pressed by technological progress are bringing substantial
changes in this practice. Thirdly, industrial relations are
in many instances losing their paternalistic character.
Company-wide unionism is still a predominant form, and in
the field of collective bargaining and even of strikes, there
still remain strong vestiges of time honored traditions of
the family system. But the main course of development points
clearly to the eventual establishment of the competitive
pattern which is common to all advanced countries. In short,
notwithstanding the apparent persistence of traditional
traits, their content and significance are undergoing basic
changes.
These changes are generally believed to have been
brought about by the dramatic reforms of the Occupation Forces.
The government bureaucracy was radically altered through the
new civil service system, the military abolished, and the
Zaibatsu, the influential financial groups, were dissolved.
The three leading powers in prewar Japan have thus been
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changed or dissolved by the policies of the Occupation Powers.
Furthermore, the reforms were not confined to the economic
field, but extended into the vast field of social activities
such as civil, religious, political, etc. - all with the
definite purpose of reforming the traditional Japanese
social structure. We refer to this as a whole as the
"democratization" of Japan. But the so-called democratiza
tion of Japan did not take place because of the Occupation
policy. If we understand by democratization all the changes
in the characteristics of the traditional society, then they
were proceeding everywhere in spite of the apparent persistency
of the old order. In other words these reforms merely gave
a final impetus to the changes that had been going on behind
the scenes.
The changes going on behind the scenes, were fairly
familiar to the people involved, and were often publicized
in the form of criticism of and arguments against the
government and business leaders. The discrepancies between
the high production potentiality and the low standard of
living, the disequilibrium between the tempo of development
of industry and that of agriculture, the difference between
the level of wages between the large firms and small firms,
or the unequal distribution of income in general—these were
the popular subjects that were put on the table of discussion
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in this connection. As a whole, these problems are the
outcome of the very speed of industrialization, and can be
found anywhere where industrialization started late and
where the efforts to catch up are most important. But in.
the case of Japan two things should be borne in mind in
addition. One is, that because of the rapid pace of
modernization in Japan these defects are felt more keenly
than elsex^here. The other is, that because of the vital
role played by the traditional society, the discussions
often tends to go to extremes. These two tendencies have
been still further strengthened by democratization since
the war. Here lies the fundamental problem of the future.
It is difficult to say anything about the future
possibilities in this context. Let me, however, try to give
some points by reviewing what has been described. We have
learned that industrialization in Japan was furthered by the
successful utilization of the traditional social structure.
The feudal system contributed much to the new organizations
of government and management, which otherwise would have
suffered from lack of discipline and efficiency. The family
system also contributed by supplying the needed labor force
without much trouble. It is surprising to find that the
type of industrialization which evolved in the Western world
could be fully transposed to quite a different environment.
This is highly instructive in suggesting the possibility
of introducing industrialization in any traditional society,
provided the necessary conditions exist: i.e. provided
that the elite is intelligent and bold enough to take the
lead in, the development, that there are enough efficient
managers to organize and control enterprises and ready to
meet the demands arising from the progress of technology,
that the workers are willing to take part in the process
gradually adapting themselves to the changes resulting from
it. In other words, this suggests that the adaptability of
older societies to the process of industrialization is far
greater than is commonly supposed.
At the same time we must bear in mind that the very
process of industrialization has a great influence on the
character of the traditional society. It involves a series
of far reaching changes in the social structure. Structural
change means chiefly a process of disintegration and
reintegration under the impact from without, a process
which tends to undermine the old social and economic
institutions, and to bring forth new patterns of social
and economic behavior. The development may either be
accelerated or delayed by the beliefs, aptitudes and wishes
of the people concerned. Generally speaking, there is a
fairly strong social resistance to new ideas, and the
intensity of this resistance is reflected in the degree of
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coherence of the traditional society in question. In the
case of Japan, as we have already seen, social tensions
of this nature were weak both at the outset and during the
course of development. But now with the changes that have
been experienced over a long time, we are faced with the
need for new patterns and a new kind of society which will
correspond to the high stage of industrialization.
The three major factors of growth which have been
our main concern in this essay, should be interpretated in
this way: they were firmly backed by the foundations of
traditional society and were thus efficient in promoting
economic growth in this connection. But what will be their
functions in the future? They are changing their character
gradually owing to the very success of industrialization.
Furthermore their change has much to do with a more
fundamental change in the supporting society which is
called now democratic in the same sense as in Western
countries. Can progress in industrialization solve all
the difficulties faced now? Can democracy supply alternatives
to the merits of the traditional society? Perhaps we can
hope to have both at a same time, since a higher stage of
industrialization may be able to afford to push a country
into becoming a welfare state, where standard of living can
be raised and differences in income distribution minimized.
-116-
Since the democratization of society will bring about the
necessary means to avoid the ailment of over-centralization
and of oligopoly in the business world.
Can Japan really realize its hopes in this respect/
For the moment one can not say anything definite in answer
to this question. If industrialism and democracy mean a
culture in themselves we can be at ease in the changing
state of society, for the lost values of the traditional
society will be replaced by them. Undoubtedly, these two
have a profound effect upon the mentality of the people
involved. They may foster entrepreneurship on the one
hand and also encourage in the people a love for their
work. They may create more attention to be given to
the well being of people who for a long time were left
uncared for. This surely means the progress of society.
But industrialism and democracy do not themselves form a
culture which can replace the culture of the old traditions.
We must not forget that in the midst of this transition
stand human beings. And as stated above where its culture
as such is concerned Japan is now at a turning point. It
is important to note that in the present situation, anything
could happen. Nationalism, reactionism and radicalism, with
their corresponding ideologies and strategies could compete
with each other for dominance. And this is why in Japan
today, it is often asked whether democracy in Japan is more
-117-
than surface deep or not. Yet looking back on the changes
which have taken place in the character and function of the
major factors of growth, Japan has successfully passed the
test of modernization in these 80 years, so why should it
not prove itself able to cope with the new changes of today
also? The essential thing is for us to comprehend the
present state of affairs correctly.
Present Status of Japanese Economy
The Japanese economy between 1956-1964 achieved an
extraordinarily rapid growth, supported largely by active
equipment investment by the nation's industries riding the
crest of worldwide technological Innovation. Meanwhile,
overheated business activities caused periodic unfavorable
balance of payments, which necessitated adjustment on four
occasions since the end of the war. During the period
1956-1964, the average annual economic growth registered
10.4 per cent in real terms. As a result, gross national
product (GNP) in 1964 reached $69,400 million, which was
the fifth highest among advanced capitalist countries. This
moved Japan up to a place behind the United States, Britain,
West Germany and France.
The year 1964 marked an epoch in the Japanese economy,
In April of that year Japan came under the application of
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Article 8 of the International Monetary Fund (IMP) agreement,
and in May the country was admitted into the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), thus
entering into a full-scale open economy system. Today,
Japan is on a par with West European countries in respect
of trade liberalization, with 93 per cent of its imports
freed and 123 items of non-liberalized goods.
Through this process of rehabilitation and develop
ment, the Japanese economy has undergone vast structural
changes. One of them is the introduction of highly advanced
industrial technique, notably in machinery and chemical
manufacturing, and the general improvement of industrial
facilities. This has led to larger shares of the so-called
heavy and chemical industries, as they accounted for 62.1
per cent of overall production in 1963 and 63.7 per cent
in 1964. So it can be said that Japan today holds a high
place internationally in several fields of manufacturing
activities, including ship-building, electronics, petroleum
refining, petrochemicals, synthetic fibers, iron and steel,
cement, machine tools and sewing machines. In 1965*
machinery makers, steel mills and chemical manufacturers
were responsible for nearly 60 per cent of the increase in
mining and manufacturing production.
Another feature of the Japanese economy in recent
years is that labor, which had tended to be in short supply
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since i960, showed the most acute shortage ever In 1963-1964.
This was particularly true of youthful workers including new
entrants to the labor force, demand for whom ran far ahead
of supply. Consequently, their starting pay was increased
and wage hikes for them registered an average of 10 per cent
in the manufacturing sector, while wage disparities between
small and medium enterprises and big businesses were improved
little by little. The swift economic growth affected Japan's
employment structure In no small measure. In the two years
of 1963 and 1964, the farm village population shrank by
840,000 in a major shift to the secondary and tertiary
industries. Income disparities were lessened and consumer
demand as a whole Increased. Consequently, consumer prices
were pushed up, notably those for services and fresh foods,
the production of which could not be stepped up sufficiently
to meet growing demands. The consumer price index thus
gained 7.6 per cent In 1963, 3.8 per cent in 1964 and
another 7.6 per cent in 1965.
The consumer price spiral is regarded as an
inevitable evil in a fast growing economy.
While producing such inequities, the Japanese economy
has survived a number of business adjustments to continue
its growth. In 1965* the nation is In the fourth postwar
adjustment period. The current recession has long endured
and has assumed serious proportions. One of the main reasons
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for this is that equipment investments had continued to expand
at a rapid pace over some years, boosting supply and causing
it to run far ahead of demand. Moreover, since investments
were made beyond the limit of accumulated capital, with re
course chiefly to money borrowed from financing institutions,
business profit deteriorated and owned funds decreased to
about 20 per cent business capital.
Nevertheless, Japanese enterprises are striving to
consolidate their business foundations through adjustment
of production and streamlining of management. The Government
in July 1965 decided to take steps for business stimulation
under its fiscal policy. In compiling the national budget
for the fiscal year 1966, substantial increases in fiscal
expenditures and sweeping tax cuts were planned. Funds were
to be raised through issuances of construction bonds in the
first major postwar deficit-financing program.
These anti-depression measures have already started
to show results, and business is expected to be revitalized.
It is expected that the Japanese economy will achieve further
development, with efforts being made for stable growth while
correcting the inequities inherent in the economy.
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Future Prospects
The wide gap between foreign and domestic technologies
has been an important factor contributing to the rapid economic
growth in this country. However, this gap has been steadily
lessened through Japan's active importation of advanced
foreign technologies. As a result, Japanese industries are
now investing more in scientific and technological research
to develop new industrial techniques. On the other hand,
it has become more difficult for Japanese industries to
promote industrial production by combining advanced foreign
technologies with the comparatively cheap and abundant
domestic labor.
An abundant supply of labor with considerably high
educational standards has been another important factor
enabling Japan to attain rapid economic growth. As the
economy expands, however, the labor market situation, has
become gradually tight. In Japan, young laborers are avail
able at lower costs; consequently Japanese firms strive to
employ recent school graduates. On the other hand, the ample
supply of laborers—young laborers in particular—which
resulted from the age composition of the population, will
start to decline in or around 1970. In the coming years,
the number of junior high school graduates who enter senior
high schools and of senior high school graduates who enter
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universities will rapidly increase. As a result, the supply
of young laborers will fall further. The declining supply
of young laborers will unavoidably change the Japanese wage
system based on seniority and will narrow the gap in wages
between the younger and older workers. Such a trend will
eventually encourage Japanese industries to use middle-aged
workers more effectively. The declining supply of labor
will also affect the lifetime employment system and will
strengthen the mobility of Japanese workers. At the same
time, the labor shortage will narrow the wage gap between
large and small enterprises, and large enterprises will
find it more difficult in the future to make use of sub
contracting arrangements by which they could utilize
relatively low-paid workers.
Such changes in the labor demand and supply situation
will accelerate the modernization of the Japanese labor
market, but on the other hand may tend to slow down the rate
of Japan's economic growth.
Until now, the labor unions in Japan have not strongly
demanded the shortening of working hours, presumably because
the wages have not been sufficiently high and the laborers
have chosen to earn more by working for a longer time rather
than to get more leisure by working for a shorter time. But
the demand for shorter working hours will become stronger in
the years to come. In ten years it will likely become a
common practice among large enterprises to adopt a 5-day-
week system. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, the
ratio of older people to the entire population of Japan
will increase. Thus the percentage of the most efficient
and productive age group will fall and that of the older
people who need social support will rise. This trend will
form another factor conducive to a lower rate of economic
growth in the long run.
It has been possible for the Japanese economy to
apply a large part of the available financial resources
directly to production, and this has been an important
factor enabling it to grow rapidly. However, as the economy
expands, the social overhead outlays for housing, transporta
tion systems, city constructions, better social environment,
and so forth will increase gradually, and direct investments
in industries for increasing production will decline relative
ly. Such a trend will undoubtedly play an important role in
bettering the living of the people who have so far been more
or less left behind by the ever-expanding economy. However,
it must be admitted also that this trend tends to slow down the
economic growth of the nation.
In the field of social security, transfer income
constitutes a smaller proportion of the national income in
Japan than in other advanced countries. This country, in
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particular, lags behind other countries in the old age
pension and other social-aid systems. Under the prevailing
employment system with lifetime commitment, expenses required
for social welfare activities have often been paid by private
enterprises and their employees. On the other hand there
are a great many people, including the employees in smaller
enterprises and self-employed workers, who receive far less
benefit from various social welfare schemes. In order to
promote democratization, the government should do its best
to lessen the gap between the employees of large enterprises
and those outside of them.
Likewise, greater importance is now attached to the
betterment of social environment. For instance, public
nuisances such as air and water pollution are now arousing
no small concern of the general public. Since a large part
of the expenses needed for the prevention of such public
nuisances are likely to be borne by the enterprises themselves,
such expenses will inevitably add to the cost of production.
The density or intensiveness of Japan's industrial
activity is already exceedingly high. In fact, the GNP
per acre of land in Japan is nearly twice as high as that
in the United States. Twenty years from now, Japan's GNP
per unit area is expected to be ten times as high as that of
the United States at present. Level land in Japan constitutes
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less than 20 per cent of her total area, and, in the future,
production activity in this country per unit area of level
land is bound to be even more intensive. This state may
work favorably for increasing the efficiency of the economy,
but at the same time it may require a larger amount of funds
for protecting the people from various public nuisances in
addition to earthquakes, typhoons, and other natural disasters
Thus, expenses for social welfare and social overhead invest
ments will definitely expand, and this is likely to reduce
the rate of Japan's economic growth to some extent.
As for the price system in Japan, both wholesale and
consumer prices had been stable until around 1959. Since
i960, however, consumer prices have been rising at an average
annual rate of 6 per cent, while wholesale prices remained
stable. Rising consumer prices have pushed up wages. During
the five years, 1955-1960, wages in the manufacturing
industries gained at an average of 39 per cent, but during
1960-1965 they went up by 63 per cent. During 1955-1960
consumer prices advanced by only 9 per cent but during
1960-1965 they rose by 35 per cent. Real wages went up by
31 per cent during 1955-1960 but by only 21 per cent during
1960-1965. Although nominal wages increased at a higher rate
during 1960-1965, the increase rate of real wages went down.
Productivity in the manufacturing industries rose by 48 per
cent during 1960-1965, or at a lower rate than nominal wages.
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Thus it may follow that if wage rates continue
to rise rapidly for a long period, the resulting rising
consumer prices may affect wholesale prices and even
tually slow down the rate of export expansion. The
rising consumer prices have aroused much discussion in
this country. The leading cause for advancing consumer
prices is generally believed to be found in the fact that
the so-called dualistic structure of the Japanese economy
is gradually diminishing, particularly in that the wages
in consumer-goods manufacturing as well as in service trades,
which have greatly depended so far upon low-wage labor, have
sharply risen. Anyway, if wages should continue to rise at
an annual rate of 10 per cent and consumer prices by 6 per
cent—if such trends should remain built-in factors in the
Japanese economy--they would prove to be serious obstacles
standing in the road of Japan's future economic growth. In
a new economic development plan covering 1967-1971* the
government is planning to take measures to reduce the
increase rate of consumer prices gradually, eventually to
an annual rate of 3 per cent by 1971•
Expansion of gross demand is another important factor
in the price spiral. During the 1965 recession, the Japanese
government decided to issue government bonds for the first
time since the war. If the government budget and the new
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issues of government bonds should continue to expand even
after the recovery of private investment, such an expansion
may cause an inflationary trend and stimulate a price hike.
The introduction of a fiscal policy as a means of adjusting
business fluctuation will mean a progress in economic
operations. But every precaution should be taken in following
such a fiscal policy, in order to prevent continued expansion
of budget expenditure depending on deficit financing.
In the process of Japan's rapid postwar economic
growth, sharply expanding export has been a great contributing
factor in the field of international accounts. In the future,
Japan's export trade is expected to encounter the following
problems:
1) Exports of Japan's traditional light-industry
products, which have depended heavily upon an ample supply
of labor, are likely to receive a challenge from newly
industrializing nations.
2) As the gap between, foreign and domestic tech
nologies is gradually narrowed, it will become less possible
for Japanese industries to easily increase the production
of competitive merchandise by importing advanced foreign
technologies.
3) Increasing outlays for social welfare activities
and social overhead investments will indirectly affect the
cost of production.
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4) The Japanese pattern of business management
has so far been raising efficiency within each enterprise,
lout it will sometimes obstruct the coordination or merger
of different enterprises and the realization of the so-
called "economies of scale." This factor may weaken Japan's
future competitiveness in the international markets. The
same factor may sometimes obstruct cooperation among
domestic and foreign enterprises and the development of
enterprises of an international scale.
All these factors may work together to lower the
increase rate of Japan's export trade in the years to come.
In spite of the factors enumerated above which are
expected to have adverse effects on Japan's future economic
growth, Japan's GNP is still expected to continue to expand
at an annual rate of around 8 per cent or more in real terms
and her exports by 10 per cent for at least several years to
come, if not at such high rates as those recorded in the
past decade. At a later stage, in the process of emerging
from the backward to the advanced stage, the Japanese economy
may grow at a more moderate rate. In the course of such
development, however, the income of the Japanese people will
probably rise to the level of that of other advanced nations,
and inequalities in the benefits from economic progress
shared by people in various walks of life are expected to be
reduced to a considerable extent.
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